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Executive Summary
In most countries natural resources are owned by the
state, although the right to exploit the natural resource
is typically granted to private companies – sometimes
in partnership with a state mining company. Companies can be granted mineral rights in different ways.
Countries with a well-developed legal system typically
grant licenses through a legal framework that fully
governs the rights and obligations of the state and the
private entity. In such a licensing system, there is very
little, if any room, for negotiation of key provisions.
On the other end of the spectrum, however, and particularly in countries with a weak or inadequate legal
framework, countries may grant mineral rights to
companies through individually negotiated agreements
that contain most, if not all the rights and obligations
of the parties. In such cases, there is a wide variation of
key contract provisions and countries regularly end up
with poorly negotiated deals that confer limited benefits to the country and the communities affected by the
mining investment and may even sit completely outside
of the legal framework of the country. For this reason,
which is more fully set out in this study, countries increasingly favor licensing regimes that limit the types
of and extent to which terms can be negotiated.
This study examines the different types of legal regimes
governing mining projects in 18 countries around the
world with a particular emphasis on the key provisions
in mining contracts as well as in law where countries
have adopted a licensing regime. In so doing, it discusses some of the reasons for which some countries
have adopted a licensing regime to fully or partially
regulate the rights and obligations of the parties in a
mining project, whereas other countries have opted to
use mining contracts to do so. Where a country relies
on contracts to govern some or all aspects of a mining
project, the study further examines the relationship between a country’s mining contracts and its legal framework, taking into account the trend – towards more
legislated terms – that minerals regimes are taking. In
addition, it analyzes the mining contract negotiation
and implementation process and attempts to identify potential opportunities to support resource-rich,
low-income countries in managing their mining investments from the planning and preparation for a contract
negotiation or licensing round to the implementation
and monitoring of the mining investment.

of 30 mining contracts from 13 countries, analyzed a
selection of legislative texts related to mining from 18
countries, and surveyed the experiences of negotiating
mining contracts through 44 interviews with 39 experts, government officials, company representatives,
and civil society organization (CSO) members.

FINDINGS
The comparative analysis of mining contracts, legal
frameworks governing mining investments and the
interviews illustrated clear issues and trends related to
mining contract negotiations and suggested several potential opportunities for support.
Negotiated mining contracts, while capable of compensating for inadequate or underdeveloped legal regimes,
far too frequently fail to achieve optimal results for a
country. The benefits negotiated agreements provide
in developing countries can also create the issues that
frequently undermine their success. A lack of transparency, or accountability, the risks of corruption, and
inconsistent terms creating difficulties in the implementation and monitoring of mining investments were
all mentioned as concerns during the interviews.
The contract negotiation process itself was also credited with creating additional concerns. In particular,
inexperience, asymmetrical information, external influences, and capacity limitations all contribute to suboptimal agreements for governments. The assistance of
external advisors can help alleviate some of these issues
but can also introduce its own. Poor coordination by
donors, duplicated efforts and a disproportionate focus
on negotiations at the expense of assisting in the entire
negotiation process have hindered the effectiveness of
these advisors.
These issues have contributed to the global trend away
from negotiated mining contracts towards legislated
terms to govern the rights and obligations of the parties
in a mining project. There has also been an increasing use of interim mechanisms such as model mining
agreements to limit the extent to which terms can be
negotiated. These are positive trends and this report
makes several recommendations on how to support
these developments.

To answer these questions, the Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (CCSI) compared the provisions
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—

Support the development of strong legal frameworks for mining and supporting model mining
agreements as an interim measure.

—

Support the negotiation of ancillary agreements,
including those that govern the development of infrastructure for a mining project, the local content
plans and community development agreements.

—

Promote contract transparency.

—

Better coordinate donor assistance.

—

Provide support both before and after a contract
negotiation.

—

Provide non-legal support to the negotiation and
implementation process.

—

Support regional legal harmonization efforts.

—

Build government capacity and understanding of
commodity markets.

Introduction
Almost every country in the world has developed a
distinct mining code, and the ones who have not, like
Azerbaijan, have developed a body of law to govern the
application, exploration, exploitation, and reclamation of
their mineral resources. The granting of mineral rights is
the point of entry for companies into a country’s mining
sector. A mineral right gives a company the exclusive
ability to undertake mining-related activities within a
designated area. The two primary regimes for granting
and administrating mineral rights are contracts and licensing. 1
In contracts regimes, mineral licenses and the accompanying rights and obligations are negotiated for specific
projects with each individual company. Contracts regimes are more prevalent in developing countries that
have young or nascent mining sectors and are supported
by less robust or reliable legal frameworks.2 The contracts system fills the gaps created by a country’s inadequate or underdeveloped mining laws and offers greater
flexibility for dealing with the unique needs and issues of
different mining projects. For countries eager for the anticipated economic benefits of mining projects, contracts
are a much quicker way to move forward than the timeand capacity-heavy process of building a strong legal
framework. Negotiated contracts also result in a body
of agreements with different terms, putting additional
monitoring and implementation burdens on already
weak administrative institutions.
Pure or strict licensing regimes define the process of
granting mineral licenses and all the accompanying
rights and obligations in generally applicable laws. In this
system, the fiscal provisions and environmental regulations are largely identical for all companies. Licensing
regimes typically exist in countries with strong institutions and a developed mineral sector. Longstanding legal
frameworks and transparent governance create a safer
investment environment.3 Public participation through
the legislative process in democratic states provides a
venue for incorporating the public’s concerns for the
sector and decreases the likelihood of political volatility.4
1

2
3
4

“Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,”
(Creative Commons, 2013), p. 12.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Lisa Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum, with James
Otto, “Impacts of Fiscal Reforms on Country Attractiveness:
Learning from the Facts,” in Karl Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (Oxford University
Press, 2012), p. 367.

Because the laws apply equally, the system is easier to
administer and limits the opportunities for corruption
in the process by allowing for stronger checks and balances.5
Historically, there has been a strong regional trend of
contracts regimes for the mining sector in Africa. In this
study alone, which was limited to countries that make at
least some mining contracts publicly available, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, and
Sierra Leone have all negotiated mining agreements in
recent years. A number of Asian countries with young
mining sectors also negotiate contracts, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Mongolia.
The reliance on negotiated contracts occurs less frequently in Latin America where licensing regimes are
more common, and there is often a long history of
mining. Chile attributes its successful minerals-based
development to a mining industry that dates back to the
1700s, a strong legal framework and its non-discretionary mineral rights regimes.6 Like Chile, Peru too has a
well-defined and unambiguous legal regime for its mineral sector.7 Ecuador, on the other hand, with its nascent
mining industry negotiated a contract in 2012 for its first
large-scale mining project.8
As legal frameworks and government capacity continue
to develop, the general trend worldwide is towards less
discretion in the granting of mineral rights.9 Most developed mining countries, including study countries
Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Chile, already use licensing
regimes and in recent years, many developing countries
have begun reviews and reforms of the legal frameworks governing their mineral sectors.10 In 2008, Zambia
5

6
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Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes: A Review of Issues and
Challenges in their Design and Application, The Challenge of
Mineral Wealth: Using Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development,” (February 2009), p. 9.
KPMG Global Mining Institute, “Chile: Country Mining Guide,”
(2014).
EY Peru, “Peru’s mining and metals investment guide 2014/2015,”
(2014).
That contract, the Ecuacorriente S.A. Agreement, was reviewed as
part of this study.
”International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 11 March 2015.
The United States is unique among mining countries as mineral
rights belong to the surface rights holder not the state. “Mineral
Rights Ownership – What is it and why is it so unique in the
USA?” International Energy Network, available at
http://www.ieneurope.com/pdf/Mineral.pdf (last visited 29 April
2015).
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r eplaced its previous mining law with a new Mines and
Minerals Development Act which expressly prohibits the
government from entering into any special agreements
for large-scale mining licenses and which annulled any
existing development agreements.11 In 2012, Liberia
began examining a switch from its contracts regime to a
licensing regime.12 In 2013, Guinea amended its Mining
Code to remove the ability to negotiate tax provisions
in mining contracts and the new code will be generally
applicable to all new mineral rights going forward.13 The
DRC now technically grants mineral rights through a
licensing regime, though a lack of retroactive application
to previously existing rights means that negotiations still
occur.14
The transition from a contracts regime to a licensing regime can be slow and difficult. A popular trend in countries going through that process is the adoption of model
mining agreements that establish a general structure
for the agreement and provide most of its non-negotiable provisions, and clearly define the limited areas that
are negotiable. Burkina Faso, DRC, Guinea, Mongolia,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone are all either developing
model agreements or have recently developed model
agreements.

11

12

13
14
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Mines and Minerals Development Act, Zambia, Arts. 159-160
(2008).
Yann Alix, “The Liberian mining law reform and the impact of
the Ebola crisis,” Herbert Smith Freehills, (October 2014).
Mining Code, Guinea, Arts. 159, 161, 163 (2013).
“Civil Society Member,” Telephone interview. 18 March 2015.

This report sets out to examine these trends. It first provides an overview of licensing regimes and the rationale
driving their use. It goes on to examine contract regimes
and the different types of investor-state contracts that
can be used in a mining investment. The report then
discusses why contracts have historically been used in
some jurisdictions and not others, and the circumstances
that might justify their continued use to regulate mining
investments. A review of key mining provisions is then
provided, with an analysis of how such terms are approached in the different regimes and how the different
types of agreements in contract regimes address these
provisions. Finally, the report analyzes the experiences
of different parties involved in the planning, preparation,
negotiation, implementation, and monitoring of mining
contracts, with an assessment of the challenges faced
in the process and an identification of best practices.
The report ultimately seeks to provide a view of the best
potential approaches for German Development Cooperation to support developing countries in granting and
administering their mineral rights.

Methodology
In preparing this report CCSI developed a matrix to
compare key contract terms. Additionally, we reviewed
at least two mining-related legislative texts in each
country. A literature review and additional open-source
research complemented this process. The team selected
the subject countries, contracts, and legislative texts in
consultation with BGR.
To ensure that the study provides a representative overview of the legal regimes governing mining globally, care
was taken to select countries representing the widest possible spectrum of experiences. The criteria used for the
selection of sample countries15 and contracts included:
—

—

—

15

16

17

Regulatory regime: We selected countries representing a range of legal and regulatory systems
generally, as well as in relation to mining-related
contracts specifically. We included countries with
both common law and civil lawsystems. In addition, we selected countries where (i) mineral rights
are governed solely through a licensing regime
under the existing legal framework, and (ii) mineral
rights are governed under a contract regime that
allows for agreements to supplement or supplant
the existing legal framework.16
Contract type: Different contract types were analyzed, including mining development agreements,
concessions, investment promotion agreements,
service agreements,17 joint venture agreements, and
production-sharing contracts.
Income level of the country: Countries with different income levels and stages of development
were chosen to show the impact of these factors
on the contract negotiation process, particularly in
relation to the fiscal and stabilization provisions.

The criteria fulfilled by each country selected for the study is
detailed further in Appendix A.
Lisa Sachs, Perrine Toledano, Jacky Mandelbaum, with James
Otto, "Regulatory and Policy Developments Regarding FDI in
Extractive Industries,"- Karl P. Sauvant, Yearbook on Int’l Investment Law and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, January
2013).
While no service agreements are reviewed as part of this study,
they are discussed in the context of the Philippines which uses
a form of service agreement called Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA).

—

Country’s experience with the mineral sector:
Some countries have only recently become attractive to mining investors as a result of rising
commodities prices over the past decade, whereas
others have a longer, more established mining
history and sector. Such differences in experience
with mining can also impact the use, style, and
content of contracts.

—

Era during which the contract was signed: The
content of contracts has gone through several
phases over the past century, shifting from being
development-oriented in the 1970s to being investment friendly in the 1980s and 1990s, and
shifting yet again toward strengthened provisions
for the host countries at the height of the commodities boom in the 2000s.

STUDY COUNTRIES WITH LAW-BASED REGIMES:
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Peru*
Zambia

STUDY COUNTRIES WITH REVIEWED CONTRACTS:
Afghanistan
Azerbaijan
Burkina Faso
Cameroon

DRC
Ecuador
Guinea
Liberia

Mongolia
Mozambique
Philippines
Sierra Leone

* Peru grants mineral rights through a licensing regime;
however, the country allows for investment promotion
agreements which can exist outside the mining sector but
can apply to mining projects. Several of those agreements
were reviewed for this study. A fuller explanation of the role
of investment promotion agreements in strict licensing regimes is provided later in this report.

After identifying the sample of countries and contracts, CCSI formulated a list of experts to interview
and drafted a comprehensive list of guiding interview
questions in conjunction with BGR. CCSI conducted 44

9

interviews to supplement its analysis of each country’s
legal regime and associated mining contracts. For almost every country in its sample, CCSI interviewed two
experts who have been involved in advising on the legal
framework, or in the contract negotiations of some of
the mining concessions with respect to that country.
The 39 interviewees included 13 external advisors,
11 government officials, 9 corporate representatives or
corporate legal counsel and 6 CSO representatives.18 In
general, most interviewees were closely involved with
mineral contract negotiations and/or the drafting or
review of at least one of the two pieces of legislation
being reviewed. CCSI’s comparative review and analysis
of legislation and contracts in the study countries were
used to inform the interviews. The insights gathered
from those interviews were in turn used to give depth
to CCSI’s analysis and influence the direction of further
research. CCSI later supplemented this work with a
second round of targeted interviews. These seven additional interviews included both those previously interviewed and two new experts and were done to resolve
outstanding questions and fill in any gaps revealed during later analysis.

18

10

Several of those interviewed have worked for both governments
and corporations in negotiations. For the purposes of this study
if the focus of the interview was their work assisting governments they are considered external advisors and if the focus was
their work for companies they are considered corporate legal
counsel.

Regulatory Regimes:
Licensing
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“Many countries with successful minerals-based
development attribute it to their non-discretionary
regimes. Chile, for example, would faint if you mention negotiation,” International Advisor.

In a regulatory regime that is purely licensing-based,
companies apply for mining licenses that are governed
by generally applicable law. All major obligations relating to the project, including taxes, royalties, environmental protections and local content requirements
are clearly established in legislation and regulations.19
Whatever the process of allocating mineral rights,
all experts concur in appreciating the net benefits of
licensing regimes (with benefits outweighing the costs).

A license (or tenement, permits or authority to mine depending on the country) is a form of “permit” in which
the government grants to a company certain exclusive
rights to mineral resources in exchange for compensation. Licenses convey the right to explore for and/or
exploit specific minerals and the authority to carry out
commercial operations, whether the regulatory regime
is law-based or contract-based. The exploitation license
can be awarded in several ways. They are frequently
issued in the same license granting exploration rights
with the exploration license providing for the right to
an exploitation license. There can however be a period
where the company has the exclusive right to apply for
an exploitation license.

For one, there are much fewer opportunities for corruption when a generally applicable law sets out the
same requirements, obligations, and benefits for every
company, than there are when negotiating directly between governments and companies.

tor that is seen as attractive and safe for major investment by foreign companies.

Second, it reduces the damage that can be inflicted in
negotiations by information asymmetries and government inexperience.

THE CHALLENGES OF LICENSING
REGIMES

Third, there is less of a burden on government administration because generally applicable laws are significantly less labor intensive to implement and monitor
than a series of different individual agreements with
varying terms. 20
Fourth, publication of both applications and decisions
allows for public sector oversight as well. 21
Fifth, a licensing regime typically places exclusive
responsibility for granting mineral rights in one regulatory or administrative body backed by law which
limits government discretion in awarding, suspending
or cancelling those rights offering companies greater
security of tenure.22 This contributes to a mining sec19

20

21
22
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"Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand Them,"
(Creative Commons, 2013), p. 14.
Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 9.
Ibid.
World Bank Group, “Sector Licensing Studies: Mining Sector,”
(January 2009); San Bilal, “Regulatory Reform in the Liberian
Mining Sector: Striking the Right Balance,” GREAT Insights (July/
August 2014); “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17
March 2015.

While all experts agree that the benefits of licensing
regimes outweigh the costs, such regimes are not free
from challenges, including some they share with contract regimes.
Difficulties of Legislative Development: Developing
the strong legal framework necessary for a licensing
regime can be a lengthy and difficult process for developing countries. Drafting, enacting and/or amending
all the legislation and regulation needed can require
the kind of significant expenditures of attention,
capacity and political capital that is difficult for a government dealing with many other issues to provide. 23
The process can be interrupted or set back by political
instability or changes in regime. Changing a single law
can be a process that takes years. This is a challenge
that decreases as a country and its legal framework
develops. 24

23
24

“International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 29 April 2015.
“International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 28 April 2015.

Less flexibility: The general framework in licensing
regimes is to be much more prescribed. 25 Removing
that flexibility and making the country less attractive to investors is a concern for some governments
when considering a licensing system. This is a concern
generally seen in developing countries with a shorter
proven history of successful mining projects. 26 Mining companies are quick to point out that all mining
projects are different. While there are serious issues
with a system where everything is open to negotiation, from a corporate perspective it offers greater
opportunity to tailor an agreement to fit specific needs
and opportunities and maximize the viability of that
individual project. One advisor observed that a negotiated agreement could allow for more specific periodic
review clauses establishing events that trigger review
or renegotiation. 27 Agreements could establish which
provisions could be adjusted, to what extent, and under
what circumstances in much greater detail than would
be capable in the law.
Legislative inaction: Changing licensing procedures
set out in laws and regulations requires changing those
laws and regulations. For almost all governments this
is a slow process. This has caused problems in some
countries where a moratorium is put on the approval of new licenses in anticipation of a new law being
enacted. In 2014, Mongolia repealed the 2012 Law on
Prohibition of Granting Exploration Licenses, which
was just the last in a series of moratoriums issued
by the government as it worked to develop its new
minerals law. 28 The possibility of a legislative change
in Brazil has resulted in an unofficial moratorium on
issuing mining licenses in that country since 2011.
Some corporate representatives expressed concern
about the impact that not having new exploration for
several years will have on the mining sector in the
future. They have also predicted further delays after
a law is passed while the new system is implemented
and the necessary capacity is developed, especially if
the system changes to auctions, which are more labor
intensive to administer. 29 The ad hoc nature of contract
negotiations, while raising issues of its own, can avoid
these problems.
25
26
27
28

29

“International Advisor.” Telephone interview. 11 March 2015.
“Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 March 2015.
“International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
Chris Melville, “Note on the Amendment to the Law of Mongolia
on Minerals dates 1 July 2014,” Hogan Lovells (26 August 2014).
“Company Executive.” Telephone interview. 10 March 2015

Tension between legal regimes: While one of the
benefits of a licensing regime is intended to be easier
administration through use of consistent terms, these
laws are generally not retroactive which can complicate the transition to a licensing regime. The DRC is a
good example. The granting of mineral rights there is
now regulated by the Mining Code, which prescribes
a mandatory procedure for the granting of a mineral
license. Applicants are generally not able to negotiate
the terms under which a license is granted. Companies
cannot contract out of any obligations of the Mining
Code. However, if a mineral right was obtained prior
to the commencement of the current Mining Code,
the law allows for such rights to be alienated under
terms negotiated by the parties. The majority of such
rights were originally held by state-owned companies,
which means that the DRC state does find itself negotiating the terms of transfer of mining agreements
– potentially in ways that conflict with the terms of
the Mining Code – to private parties, or to public-
private joint ventures. This loophole does not extend
to all contractual terms. For instance, the agreement
cannot derogate from the Tax Code. Nonetheless, the
ability to negotiate out of existing laws in this narrow
circumstance undermines the intentions of a licensing regime and complicates its administration. Additionally, companies which entered into contracts for
mineral rights prior to the introduction of the Mining
Code and its associated licensing system in 2002 had
the option of continuing to operate under the previous
regime, which allowed for the negotiation of contractual terms.30
Despite the licensing provisions of the Mining Code,
the DRC has also since signed a number of resourcesfor-infrastructure agreements. These agreements, arranged directly between the government and primarily
Chinese or Korean investors, simply exchanged minerals for large infrastructural development projects. 31
The legality of these agreements was an open question
until 2014 when the DRC legalized these arrangements
as public private partnership (PPP) conventions. This
new PPP law carved out a special legal environment
and tax regimes for these projects. 32
30

31
32

“Civil Society Representative.” Telephone interview. 18 March
2015.
Global Witness, “China and Congo: Friends in Need,” (March 2011).
Upio Kakura Wapol, “A New Legal Framework to Promote the
Public-Private Partnership in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo,” Cabemery (29 April 2014).
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Contract Regime

Key Features

 Terms governed by generally applicable law
—
— Frequently used in developed countries or
those with established mining sectors

— Terms primarily established in individually
negotiated agreements
— Frequently used in developing countries or
those with young mining sectors

Benefits

 Less opportunity for corruption
—
— Reduced information asymmetries
— Easier to implement
— Public oversight
— Security of tenure

— Flexibility and specificity
— Supplements gaps in inadequate legal frameworks
— Signals government commitment

Challenges

 Difficulties of legislative development
—
— Less flexibility
— Legislative inaction

— Often poorly negotiated
— Discretion
— Varying contract terms can complicate
implementation
— Undermining confidence in rule of law
— Confidentiality
— Sanctity of contracts

Regulatory Regimes:
Contracts

15

Almost all countries in the world have a mining law –
Azerbaijan being a notable exception – that they use
to regulate their mining sector, but only some of them
– including the 13 countries which have contracts
reviewed in this study – allow for the possibility of
negotiated state agreements creating special regulatory systems for mining projects.33 Contracts secure a
company’s right to explore and/or exploit mineral re
sources in exchange for the agreed upon compensation
to the government. The difference between the licenses/
concessions in a pure licensing regime and contracts
in a pure contractual regime is that in the latter the
contract is the primary document establishing the
terms and governing the project. Such contracts cover
the same issue areas as those in a licensing regime, but
the depth, detail and specificity with which they do so
depends on the level of development and comprehensiveness of the country’s legal regime.
Unlike in a pure licensing regime, negotiated contracts
can supplement or even supplant existing laws. 34 In
many cases these contracts are then ratified by the
legislature making them essentially laws unto themselves.35
Purely contractual regimes are less common now, and
the overwhelming trend has been to regulate mining
through clear, strong legislation and regulation and
to rely on mining and tax codes, environmental laws,
health and safety regulations, and other generally
applicable laws rather than negotiating different terms
for different parties.36 Liberia, for example, is in the
process of updating its mineral law, in part to switch
from its current contract-based regime to a licensing
regime. This is an objective for the government because it expects the new regime to reduce the carveouts from the law currently being made through the
use of negotiated agreements.37 In addition to that government benefit, in interviews government officials expressed the belief that a licensing regime will provide
greater security of tenure for companies by limiting

the government’s discretion in awarding, suspending
and cancelling a company’s mineral rights. 38
However, governments – generally in developing countries with young mining sectors – are still negotiating
contracts with companies, and a number still heavily
rely on them to establish a company’s rights and obligations for a specific project. There are several reasons
why contracts are still in use. First, countries generally
do so because they are just beginning to develop their
mineral sectors and have existing legal regimes that
are inadequate or insufficiently developed to regulate mining projects without the help of negotiated
contracts. Some have argued that this illustrates their
value in establishing a stable framework for a project
and overcoming market deficiencies. 39 Other international advisors argue that the heightening expectations
for the benefits mining projects will create will always
make agreements necessary to supplement legislation,
which is inherently slow to adapt to adequately address
new issues.40
Similarly, negotiation can be useful in situations where
even with well-developed laws and regulations a
country needs the flexibility to accommodate a special
mining project.41 This could occur in the context of
greenfields – unexplored territory where it is unknown
if minerals exist – or new types of mining where governments have an interest in encouraging investment
but don’t want those incentives to be permanent.42
This is also seen with exceptionally large or unusual projects that require special tax provisions to be
commercially viable.43 This situation, which was most
frequently invoked during interviews in regards to
Australia, is discussed further below.44

38

39

33

34

35

36

37
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Sachs, Toledano, Mandelbaum, with Otto, "Regulatory and Policy
Developments Regarding FDI,” 2013, op. cit.
The Study Country Selection Criteria matrix in Appendix A
identifies which countries have contracts that supplement the
law and those with contracts that supplant the law.
Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 33.
Sustainable Development Strategies Group, “Model Mining
Development Agreement – Transparency Template,” (May 2012).
Alix, “The Liberian mining law reform,” 2014, op. cit.

40

41

42
43

44

Bilal, 2014, op. cit; “Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17
March 2015.
Richard Hillman, “The Future Role for State Agreements in Western Australia,” Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 293
(2006), p. 301.
Sustainable Development Strategies Group, “Model Mining
Development Agreement – Transparency Template,” (May 2012).
Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 33
“Government Official.” Telephone interview. 21 April 2015.
Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
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“Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 4 March 2015; “Corporate Lawyer.” Telephone interview. 13 March 2015.

DIFFERENT CONTRACT ROLES
Consistent with expectations, interviews and reviewed
contracts show that countries that negotiate ad hoc
contracts tend to see substantial variation in contract
terms across their mining sector. The variation can
be attributed to the different types of contract, the
circumstances under which it was negotiated, when it
was negotiated, and how it interacts with existing law.
There is a range of different types of natural resource
contracts45 and the type used depends on the stage
of the mining process, the legal regime of the host
country, the governments and companies involved
and their needs, and even the political and economic
dynamics of the era in which they were concluded.
Mining (Development/Lease) Agreement: Mining
agreements (or “concession agreements” in civil law
countries/“conventions” in French) are the most
prevalent natural resource contracts. Traditional
mining agreements date to the early 20th century
before the development of integrated commercial law
frameworks. They were frequently used in countries
under colonial control to exempt investors from being
bound by generally applicable law.46 In transition from
traditional concession agreements that deferred key
decisions to the company, these development agreements introduced work requirements and required
government approval to undertake certain activities.47
The report found these agreements to generally be the
most comprehensive in scope. They generally provide for the granting of exploration and exploitation
licenses, though systems where licenses and contracts
are concluded separately do exist. They may also
include tax provisions, local procurement requirements, the right for the company to process, market
and sell the minerals it extracts, a company’s community development obligations, and provisions for state
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Chapter 4 (Westminster, Colorado: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation, 2002).
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participation and/or control.48 The reviewed mining
agreement between the government of Cameroon and
Cam Iron SA, for example, illustrates the agreement’s
breadth as it explicitly governs:
“the technical, legal, tax, customs, economic, administrative, land, employment and environment
conditions with a view to the Parties’ performance
of this Project; and...the main terms and conditions for carrying out the Mining Operations
within the Exploitation Area.” 49
For developing countries with immature legal regimes
that are not yet able to fully regulate the mining sector, such mining development agreements may contain
rules and regulations constituting the law of the project. (The issues of negotiation are discussed in greater
detail earlier in this section.)
Service Agreement: While an example was not publicly available from the countries selected for this report,
a service agreement, as the name implies, is a contract
in which the government hires a company to perform
its mining operations, but the government retains control and ownership of the minerals. These agreements
were common in the post-colonial era as newly independent countries nationalized industries like mining
that were previously dominated by foreign-owned
companies. The decision to nationalize the mining
sector and create a national mining company to run
it was very political; it signaled a separation from the
colonial system and was an assertion of sovereignty
by reclaiming ownership of national assets. However,
practically, these newly created national companies
frequently lacked the experience and knowledge necessary to run actual operations, so they hired foreign
mining companies to do so. The scope of these service
agreements was frequently less all-encompassing than
mining agreements and often divided services between
different providers. The country owned the minerals,
infrastructure and equipment and the companies were
compensated either in cash or a share of production
for their services.50 These types of agreements have
been less common since the 1990s as the shift towards
re-privatization of the mining industry began industry
48
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led to governments giving up their role as miners and
only taking on the role of regulator.51
Some countries still utilize service agreements, typically for retaining foreign companies to provide technological and other support to the national mining company that operates the project.52 In the Philippines, full
state control and supervision in the exploration and
development of mineral resources are fundamental to
the country, so the law prohibits the government from
partnering with mining companies that are not at least
60% Filipino owned.53 But since the country lacks the
necessary capital for large-scale mining operations, it
created the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) which, as a service agreement, is not
covered by the restriction and allows the government
to enter into agreements with wholly foreign-owned
companies.54
Investment Promotion Agreement: As service agreements were becoming less common, some countries
began shifting from mining development agreements
to investment promotion agreements. After the economic crises of the 1970s – 1980s, countries began to
reconsider the state-run approach to management,
and in the 1990s, there was a legislative shift away
from such systems towards pre-privatization. This was
mirrored in the mining sector in a move from the previous developmental focus of mining contracts toward
investment promotion. These shifts coincided with a
period of low commodity prices that created competition between countries for foreign investment, leading
to investment promotion agreements.
These agreements, designed to promote investment,
were a way of supplementing or supplanting the law.
Stabilization provisions are a notable focus of these
agreements because protection for companies from
arbitrary legislative changes is seen as a key to creating
an investor-friendly climate.55 Because these agreements can exist outside of the legal regime governing
mining, they are used even in countries with strict
mineral licensing systems. Both Peru and Chile have

signed a number of investment promotion agreements
supplementing the law and stabilizing fiscal terms in
exchange of the companies paying a higher royalty
rate than the statutory one. A 2009 agreement between
Peru and the company Minera Chinalco S.A. analyzed
for this study guaranteed the company:
“tax stability in accordance with Art. 80(a) and (e)
of the general mining law...Moreover, the income
tax, the method of determining tax rates and the
tax rates, the compensation for and/or return of
taxes, customs duties, municipal taxes, exemptions, incentives, and any other benefits relating to
stabilized taxes and schemes are governed by the
rules applicable at the date of the signing of the
contract...The company is not bound by any law
passed after the date of signature of the contract
that might directly or indirectly alter the guarantees set out in [this article] of the contract.” 56
Joint Venture: In the context of this report, joint
venture agreements are contracts where a government
(often through its national mining company) partners with one or more private companies on a mining project. Mining companies also frequently form
initial joint ventures among themselves that then sign
agreements with governments.57 The partnership can
be an alternative to a debt or equity financing for a
company trying to raise capital for, or a government
lacking the expertise necessary for, a mining project. 58
The Manomin tin mine in the DRC is operated by a
joint venture between DBB Resources Corporation and
La Congolaise d’Exploitation Miniere, a private limited
liability company 50% owned by the state. 59
Joint venture agreements were originally one approach
to asserting a country’s sovereign right over its minerals as a post-colonial reaction to the previous regimes.
In them, government typically exercised control of
the joint venture via board membership or some other
contractually defined management system.60
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Production Sharing Agreement: Production sharing
agreements (PSAs) are fairly rare in the mining sector,
particularly compared to the petroleum sector where
they are very common. Their front-loaded nature, allowing higher cost recovery by the company, as well as
the continuous need for additional capital investment
as the mineral deposits become more difficult to access
and extract, makes the production sharing aspect of
PSAs a poorer fit for mining than for petroleum.61
Production limits are another common feature of PSAs
that does not align well with solid mineral mining.
Only a few countries, such as the Philippines, still use
them.62 This study reviewed several of the PSAs currently in force in that country.

DIFFERENCES IN CONTENT
Given the range of factors influencing the decisionmaking around mining projects, it can be difficult to
attribute differences in contract terms to the type of
agreement. However, agreements often reflect the political and economic priorities of the era in which they
were drafted, both in terms of their type and content,
allowing for the designation of a few identifiers.63 For
example, service agreements allow for a reassertion
of state sovereignty in the post-colonial period, while
investment promotion agreements spur foreign direct
investment in the mining sector. In turn, joint venture agreements can help to facilitate the financing of
expensive mining projects. Analysis of the contracts in
this study suggests that the differences between agreement types are more readily observable in the priority
given to or the inclusion/exclusion of, certain terms
than in the precise substance of the terms themselves.

61

62

63

Commonwealth Secretariat & International Council on Mining
and Metals, “Minerals Taxation Regimes,” 2009, op. cit., p. 31.
In the case of the Philippines, the country’s Constitution (1987)
provides for the government to have full control and supervision
of the mineral sector, and that the government may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements
to undertake mineral activities where it does not wish to do so
directly itself. Art. 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines (1987) available at: http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/
the-1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines/the1987-constitution-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-article-xii/.
James Otto, “Mineral Agreements,” in The Regulation of Mineral
Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and Policy
(Institute for Global Resources Policy and Management Colorado
School of Mines, 2002).

Guinea provides an illustrative example. This study
reviewed a concession for a bauxite mine the government of Guinea signed with the Fria company in 1958,
the same year it became independent. The concession
included no provisions for state participation. A second
agreement reviewed in this study, signed with Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG) in 1963, five years
after independence, while still a concession agreement,
required a 49% minority ownership share for the government and clearly asserted government ownership of
mining-related infrastructure even if built by the company.64 These provisions clearly reflected the post-colonial movement for newly independent countries to assert
their sovereignty over their resources. Similarly, the content and focus of joint venture and service agreements
emphasize the country’s ownership and control.
Mining development agreements came into fashion in
the 1970s and 1980s and, as befits their name, emphasized provisions requiring upstream and downstream
economic linkages. While these agreements would all
include provisions for development, such as infrastructure development, the terms themselves could vary
substantially, in breadth, form, and level of detail.65
Many, if not most, mining development agreements
include local content provisions of some kind, giving
preference to local goods and services.
In this area, investment promotion contracts sharply
differ from other types of agreements. Local content
provisions, like most development objectives, can
be seen as discouraging investment, and thus, such
provisions tend not to appear in investment promotion
contracts.66 Additionally, in these contracts, government control of the resources, so important in joint
venture, service, and often development agreements,
is deemphasized due to concerns about discouraging
investment. These contracts often include provisions
limiting the discretion of the government to exercise
its statutory authority in an effort to limit the risks of
arbitrary decision-making.67
In the last two decades there has been a return towards
the development agreement emphasis on mining as
64
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an engine of economic development and diversification. Decried as “resource nationalism” by companies,
it is driven by a boom in commodity prices and the
perception by governments that mining had not been
producing sufficient in-country benefits. Older agreements are being renegotiated and new agreements now
might include higher royalty rates, windfall and capital
gains provisions to ensure countries receive their fair
share of the benefits of their natural resources.68

other provisions may still make reference to existing
applicable law. The reviewed agreement between Mongolia and Ivanhoe Mines for the Oyu Tolgoi Project, for
example, supplements the scant local content provisions of Mongolia’s mining law with substantially more
detailed local content provisions.72 However, in other
provisions the agreement explicitly defers to Mongolia’s applicable law. An example of this is the following
provision in the agreement:
“The investor shall comply with the international
treaties in relation to environmental protection
matters to which Mongolia is a party and Articles
35 and 37 of the Minerals Law and shall obtain
detailed environmental impact assessment reports
(the “EIA Reports”) in accordance with the Law on
Environmental Impact Assessment prepared by a
competent, independent, professional firm.” 73

WHEN ARE CONTRACTS USED
“People negotiate agreements because they want concessions in the law. The moment the government says ‘Let’s
talk,’ the government is saying it is ready to go outside
the law.” – Government official
A strict hierarchy of legislation exists in the legal
framework of a country with a licensing regime. A
country’s supreme law is its constitution, followed
by its laws, the regulations promulgated pursuant to
the laws, and then contracts. However, in countries
with less robust legal regimes and a strong reliance on
negotiated mining contracts as a result, contracts may
be specifically designed to supplant all legislation.69
The implication of this practice is that such contracts
should not be necessary if and when a country develops a more mature and sophisticated legal regime.
However, some international advisors have speculated that this system of negotiated contracts actually
hinders progress towards such a regime.70 For example,
those interviewed suggest that the law is most often
supplanted in relation to fiscal terms. Frequently, the
tax laws are among the most robustly developed laws
relevant to the project in developing countries, but
companies regularly negotiate exceptions to the law to
profit from better fiscal terms than provided for in the
country’s legislation.71
Contracts that supplement or supplant a country’s
legal framework can differ in content from each other.
Where contracts supplement the law, the provisions
being supplemented will be detailed and specific, but
68
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In contracts that supplant the law, the provisions can
be detailed and specific or scant, but they will not defer
to the general law. Additionally, agreements supplanting the law usually – and particularly in common law
jurisdictions – need to be codified into law in order to
legally take precedence over the law.74 One international lawyer noted that the use of such agreements can
also provide clarity on the rules governing the project
in countries with weak governments. Where a country’s general law is outdated and needs to be updated
to reflect current practices, such contracts can provide
an ad hoc solution until the relevant laws are updated.75 As countries develop deeper and more robust
legal frameworks and it becomes increasingly difficult
to justify supplanting the law, negotiated agreements
could still be useful in supplementing the law to fill in
gaps, or where greater specificity is required.76
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Infrastructure provisions were frequently cited by
interviewees as benefiting from supplementary provisions in agreements. The mining sector can have
unique infrastructure needs depending on the location and size of a mining development that would be
difficult to address in a general law.77 Liberia’s mining
law merely states that mineral rights holders have “the
right to install any and all industrial infrastructure
necessary for and incidental to mine or quarry operations, in accordance with prevailing standards of the
mining and quarry industries worldwide, this law and
the regulation.” 78 The agreement for the Western Cluster iron ore project is used to go into much more specifics, requiring the company to build a two-lane, asphalt paved, all-weather road connecting Tubmanburg
and the Mano River and a railroad from the mines to
the port. It also reserves ownership for the roads and
the fixed assets of the railroad for the government,
while requiring the company to maintain them.79
Similarly, third-party usage of infrastructure is often
dealt with through such supplementary agreements.80
Liberia’s mining law again merely states that company
infrastructure “within the area subject of the mineral
rights may be used by government or third parties
provided however, that fair compensation shall be paid
and that such use does not interfere with or hinder
the [company’s] operations.” 81 The Western Cluster
agreement then again supplements that with substantial provisions detailing third party access to the
project’s port, railways and power supply, how fees for
use will be set and the costs and revenues divided.82 As
addressed later in this paper in the discussion of key
terms, the specificity of these provisions to the project,
its needs and location make it infeasible to establish
them in a generally applicable law.83
Project specificity can also require supplementing
agreements establishing the minimum mineral output
level a company is required to maintain. This is an
example of a provision that can be difficult to set out
in legislation because it will depend on factors specific
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to the mine site, the mineral being mined, the market,
etc.84 Local community provisions, from development
to resettlement, were also mentioned as often needing
supplementing agreements due to their specificity.85
One expert interviewed also raised the debt-to-equity ratio as a provision that, due to weak laws and the
dangers of tax avoidance, could often benefit from a
supplementing agreement.86
Several experts with experience advising developing
country governments noted that, in practice, once a
country allows the possibility of negotiating an agreement with supplementary provisions, it can easily find
itself with a final agreement that supplants the law.87
Companies, seeing that there is room to negotiate can
often use political pressure or political connections to
expand what is available for discussion, and achieving
terms that are in conflict with the law.88 Strong political will, clear limits on the discretion of the negotiating team, as well as strong public accountability can
all help guard against such scenarios.89 The agreement
with Ivanhoe Mines for the Oyu Tolgoi Project is one
such example. At the time, the mining law allowed for
the negotiation of an agreement on tax stabilization
only, but the company made additional requests such
as investment allowances not foreseen by the law.
However ultimately parliament refused those changes
and the contract only supplements the law. 90
Stabilization Clauses: Both the research and the interviews found that one of the most frequent (and contentious) mechanisms for supplanting the law is including
stabilization provisions in the contracts. 91 The study’s
contract matrix shows stabilization clauses take one
of two forms. First, there are those that exempt the
company from being bound by new laws or regulations that might be enacted that negatively impact the
company’s rights and obligations under the agreement.
This is the type of clause the study found Sierra Leone
still negotiating, even as it builds its mineral governance including the passage of the Mines and Minerals
Act of 2009. The government’s agreement with London
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Mining for an iron ore project exempted it from paying
the statutory tax rate. 92 Meanwhile the stabilization
clauses in agreements negotiated prior to the law, such
as the one with Sierra Rutile Limited specifically supplanting any laws (including the subsequent 2009 Act)
in instances where the provisions of law are inconsistent with those of the agreement, remain in effect. 93
A typical example of this type of clause comes from
Guinea’s Zogota agreement:
“The government warrants the company from the
date of grant of the concession and throughout its
full duration the stabilization of current legislation and of all provisions, particularly fiscal and
concerning customs and excise, stipulated in this
agreement. Accordingly, all changes to current
legislation, particularly fiscal and/or concerning
customs and excise, after the date of grant of the
concession that would as a result increase, whether
directly or indirectly, the company's tax and/or
customs and excise charges would not be applicable for it.
On the other hand, the company may validly take
advantage of such changes if their effect is to reduce its tax and/or customs and excise charges.” 94
This type of stabilization clause can be a politically
contentious issue as it is seen as inhibiting a country’s
sovereignty by restricting the government’s ability
to make and pass laws. Such far-reaching exemptions
from the application of new laws and regulation includes environmental and social regulations, potentially preventing the government from adopting and
requiring current environmental best practices for all
of the country’s mining projects. 95
The second type of stabilization attempts to establish
economic equilibrium. It does not exempt the company from application of new laws or regulations, but
entitles it to be compensated by the government for
any materially adverse financial effects it suffers as a
result. Typically, if changes favor the company, it is al92
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lowed to enjoy those benefits. 96 See the RV Investment
agreement in Azerbaijan:
“The rights and interests accruing to [the company]
under this agreement and its sub-contractors under
this agreement shall not be amended, modified or
reduced without the prior consent of [the company].
In the event that any governmental authority invokes
any present or future law, treaty, intergovernmental
agreement, decree or administrative order which contravenes the provisions of this agreement or adversely or positively affects the rights or interests of [the
company] hereunder, including, but not limited to, any
changes in tax legislation, regulations, or administrative practice, or jurisdictional changes pertaining to
the contract area, the terms of this agreement shall be
adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium of
the parties, and if the rights or interests of [the company] have been adversely affected, then [the state-owned
mining company] shall indemnify [the company] for
any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circum
stances, loss or damages that ensue therefrom.” 97
Increasingly, stabilization clauses, when used at all, are
heavily circumscribed to apply only to specific fiscal
provisions and only for specific lengths of time tied to
the time necessary for a company to repay its financing. Guinea recently limited stability to tax provisions
and for a maximum of 15 years and Burkina Faso is
considering limiting tax stability to no more than 20
years. 98 Shorter, more focused stabilization also helps
address the administrative difficulties these provisions
can cause by creating varying contracts with varying
tax provisions that must be overseen and enforced by
institutions frequently operating under severe capacity
limitations.
In some countries stabilization clauses require companies to accept higher tax rates. In Chile and Peru,
two countries with strong legal frameworks and where
mineral rights are granted through a strict licensing
regime, both allow for stabilization agreements to
supplement the law. Companies that want such agreements are required to pay additional taxes or royalties,
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essentially a fee for the increased fiscal protection. No
companies in Chile have as of yet been willing to do so.99
Contracts for Exceptional Circumstances: Experts say
there can be rare occasions where a project is so large
it warrants the exceptional regulation of a negotiated
agreement,100 though some international experts point
out the criteria for what constitutes an exceptional
project is not clearly defined.101 Generally speaking,
they would be projects of such significant scale that
the existing legal regime related to mining, taxation,
transportation, etc. proves inadequate. For instance
longer leases than provided by existing law might be
required; special provisions around water rights or
power generation might be necessary. In these circumstances, a negotiated agreement could allow the needed
flexibility to make the project feasible.
The clearest examples of such situations are in Australia. The use of negotiated agreements, which were then
enacted into law through special agreement acts, in
Australia really began in the 1950s when its legislation
was largely outdated or inadequate for dealing with
large-scale mining projects, particularly those involving substantial construction of infrastructure. The
agreements allowed for terms suited to the circumstances of such projects without requiring immediate
legislative reforms, which would have been a time
consuming process of piecemeal amendment of numerous statutes. They were generally used for massive
projects of major economic importance. Restrictions
on the state’s ability to borrow money prevented them
from financing the infrastructure, requiring a mechanism for securing private investment. The required
scale and infrastructure investment were typically
the determinative factors in the decision to negotiate
an agreement.102 In 1968 for example, the government
of Queensland passed the Central Queensland Coal
Associates Agreement Act which ratified the agreement
establishing four mines to develop coal deposits in the
Bowen Basin which would eventually supply more
than half of the country’s coal exports. An agreement
was used because the mines required the construc-

tion of towns, railways and a coal port. In contrast,
the Blackwater mine in that same Bowen Basin was
licensed under the Coal Mining Acts because it had
access to existing infrastructure.103 Other rationales
for negotiated agreements in Australia include the
infeasibility of granting the necessary access to the
land, to water resources or providing the certainty of
tenure the project requires through generally applicable legislation.
Agreements can also facilitate the obtaining of better
financing for companies by signaling the government’s commitment to and support for the project.104
Project costs in developing countries or in remote
locations can be quite high, necessary infrastructure
often doesn’t exist, higher operating costs mean higher
initial capital expenditures and the country’s rule
of law and bankruptcy protections may be weak. In
those circumstances companies, their investors and
financiers desire reassurance they can recover their
investment.105 An agreement, not only stabilizing fiscal
provisions or signaling the government’s support for
the project but also implicitly endorsing the company’s
ability to develop and manage it, mitigates some of the
risk and can lower the cost of financing. They provide
even greater authority and security if they are codified
into statutory law.106
Australia has been criticized for lacking clear criteria on when it is appropriate to negotiate, and the
agreements have been subject to many of the criticisms leveled at negotiated agreements in developing
countries. An independent review commissioned by
the government in 2002 found public concern about
the lack of public involvement in negotiations and the
committee recommended a substantially reduced role
for state agreements.107 In practice they have already
become much rarer.108 One expert interviewed suggested that because tax laws are federal, these provincial
government agreements did not provide sufficient
guarantee for companies or benefits for government
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and so have been largely discontinued.109 Of the two
major mining states, Queensland has not entered into
any such agreements since the 1980s, and according to
several experts Western Australia has also not done so
in a number of years.110

BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF
NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS
Among those interviewed, negotiating agreements is
generally not a well thought of approach to natural
resource management at the moment. When asked
about recommended best practices for negotiating
mining contracts, one mining lawyer with extensive
experience advising governments quipped, “avoid
negotiated agreements.”111 As more and more countries move towards licensing regimes you hear very
few justifications for negotiation. One is to facilitate
extremely large mining projects requiring special
accommodation as discussed above. Those instances
are rare.112 The other situation where negotiation is
still widely used is in countries with a nascent mining
sector and/or an underdeveloped legal framework for
minerals.
Sierra Leone offers one such example. After it emerged
from its civil war in the early 2000s it was a post-conflict country, with little infrastructure, weak institutions and a desperate need for investment and development. The government faced a difficult choice. It
could wait to open the country to mining and spend
years and resources it didn’t have trying to develop
its capacity, its mining, environmental, tax and labor
legal frameworks, and its governance mechanisms
with no guarantees it would pay off or it could forge
ahead knowing it is not an ideal scenario in the hope
that a successfully negotiated mining project would
help them develop that capacity while also providing
economic growth, revenue, development and employment opportunities. Given the intense need, the public
pressure to show results and the country’s political
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STUDY COUNTRIES RANKED ON TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL’S CORRUPTION PERCEPTION
INDEX (2014)
Country
Australia
Canada
Chile
Brazil
Mongolia
Burkina Faso
Peru
Philippines
Zambia
Liberia
Ecuador
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan
Cameroon
Guinea
DRC
Afghanistan

Rank
11
10
21
69
80
85
85
85
85
94
110
119
119
126
136
145
154
172

Score
80
81
73
43
39
38
38
38
38
37
33
31
31
29
27
25
22
12

Bold: Licensing Regimes

instability the government made the decision to negotiate agreements.113
Unfortunately, the research suggests the same circumstances forcing governments to negotiate contracts make negotiation a dangerous proposition.
Inexperience and a desperate need for investment and
development put governments in very poor bargaining positions. Asymmetrical information and a poor
understanding of the complexities of the agreement
undermine negotiations. Weak central government
and public institutions hamper government coordination and management. Capacity restraints and the high
cost of enforcement hinder effective oversight.114 In
these contexts, negotiated agreements can create their
own issues:
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Discretion: One of the most common criticisms of
negotiated agreements is the significant discretion it
gives to a small number of people to conclude wide
ranging and potentially lucrative deals, often with little to no oversight, public consultation, or transparency. Oftentimes negotiations are conducted by someone
at the ministerial level or higher, and these are political
appointees who may lack the necessary knowledge in
this area.115 These are fertile conditions for corruption.
If negotiations are going to be conducted, the government needs an advisory board or an inter-ministerial
commission that includes high-ranking representatives
from all relevant ministries.116 Its composition, mandate and decision-making process should be enshrined
in legislation to give added weight to its authority, but
even then it is no guarantee of success.
The current laws in Sierra Leone allow less discretion
than they did a decade ago. Its legal framework has
evolved.117 Yet the licensing process is vague, companies negotiate directly with the Ministry responsible
for mining and the Minister still appears to be able to
grant mining licenses at his discretion.118
Countries that negotiate contracts are increasingly dealing with the issue by narrowing the scope of
that discretion. Both legislation restricting the terms
that are open to negotiation and using model mining agreements can limit the risks that go along with
wide-ranging discretion. A model mining agreement
is currently being developed in Sierra Leone for these
reasons.119 (The trend towards model mining agreements is discussed further later in this report.)
While strong correlations should not be drawn between the rankings of the study countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
(see Box) and their choice in mineral rights regimes,
it does show that the study countries with the lowest
levels of corruption in their public sectors also tend to
use licensing regimes. We note here that discretion and
corruption are not issues exclusive to contracts. A licensing regime might restrict discretion through standard
terms set out in the generally applicable mining laws,

but that does not necessarily extend to the ancillary
agreements related to the project. Several interviewees
from Australia mentioned preferential treatment for
a company in the form tax breaks or exemptions in
infrastructure agreements related to mining projects
as a past issue.120
Confidentiality: Given that mining agreements involve
publicly owned resources and can have significant
repercussions for a country’s development, mining
agreements are not just contracts concluding commercial terms; they are public policy documents as
well. Yet, they have historically been seen as strictly
confidential, and in some past instances, they were not
shared with even the ministries that had responsibilities and obligations stemming from the agreement’s
terms.121 The stability of an agreement requires those
subject to it to accept it as legitimate. That, in turn,
requires knowledge of what it contains.122
In the last decade, there has been a powerful movement away from that approach and towards the
transparency of agreements between governments
and mining companies. The Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), an initiative promoting the open and accountable management of natural
resources has gained tremendous traction. Forty-eight
countries now implement EITI and another 32 comply
with its requirements, including the countries publishing detailed reports on the mining revenue they
receive. EITI also encourages its members to publish
their mining contracts.123
Countries increasingly are now publishing their
mineral agreements, including a number in this study.
Afghanistan, DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique and
Sierra Leone all now publicly release their mining
agreements. Peru, which uses a licensing regime for
its mineral rights, does publish its investment promotion agreements which are sometimes used for
mining projects (see explanation above). This transparency can be due to legislative requirement (Liberia
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and Mozambique), voluntary commitments (DRC and
Guinea), or as the result of the ratification of agreements in Parliament (Sierra Leone and Liberia). Recent
contracts in Guinea, Liberia and Mongolia reviewed
for this study have even included clauses specifically
making them public.124 In other instances, companies
have made agreements public through the filings and
disclosures they are required to make to be listed on
various stock exchanges, including several mining
agreement between SEMAFO and the government of
Burkina Faso.125
The study found no indications supporting a basis
for fears that contract disclosure will have a chilling
effect on investment. Liberia, for example, has signed
a number of large mining agreements since enacting
legislation to require public disclosure of the agreements. Disclosing contracts might initially appear to
conflict with the confidentiality provisions included
in many contracts, but most restrictions typically
focus on protecting commercially sensitive data and
information, the definition of which usually does not
include the contract itself.126 Countries like Guinea that
have retroactively made its contracts public have not
experienced any issues.127
The reality is that many “confidential” agreements are
already available, albeit often on expensive commercial
databases regularly used by companies. As more than
one government advisor observed, companies have access to other companies’ contracts either through their
lawyers, experts, databases or because they communicate with each other or because in countries like Sierra
Leone where contracts are ratified in Parliament, they
are public. This allows them to compare terms and ask
the government during negotiations to explain why
the terms are different.128 This is another area where
the government suffers from asymmetrical informa124
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tion. In that context, disclosing agreements publicly
only helps with the information asymmetry between
companies and governments.129
Such transparency efforts are also intended to improve
governance and accountability and through public
accountability combat the risks created by discretion.
As one government official posited, there are only two
explanations for poor agreements: corruption or a lack
of capacity and experience on the part of the government.130 Transparency can address not just the former
but also to some extent the latter, by making the agreements available to those with the capacity to analyze
and bring attention and scrutiny to poor agreements.131
This is particularly true when contracts are ratified by
parliament. If properly done, the legislative discussion
on the contract and opportunity for greater public
involvement allows for oversight and review before
the contract is finalized and implemented. It can allow
for broader support and answer the frequent criticism
that the public was not involved in negotiations. In
Mongolia, after review Parliament sent the Oyu Tolgoi
Project agreements back to the government to make
changes.132 Clearly, transparency efforts are having
some success in mitigating the issue of discretion in
contract negotiations, but in the present they are still
insufficient.133
Corruption, lack of political will, or simple logistical issues can keep contracts hidden even in countries with
transparency laws. Afghanistan’s new Minerals Act
does not require the publication of all mining agreements, preventing civil society organizations (CSOs)
from accessing certain mining contracts of interest to
them.134 In Sierra Leone, contracts are published online, but the country’s high illiteracy rate and low level
of Internet penetration render them unavailable to
large sections of the population.135 In many cases when
contracts are available, domestic education efforts are
still needed to enable the public to understand the
often complex agreements. The time and effort required of CSOs and the public to hold the government
129
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accountable for the terms of each negotiated contract
still currently remains much more significant than in a
licensing regime with its uniform terms.136
Implementation and Monitoring: Negotiating terms
for a mineral agreement often focuses on not only
provisions like the rate of income tax, but also the definition of income. Negotiating is determining what can
be deducted against income, what losses can be carried
forward, or how to calculate base rates to determine
royalties. Everything could be open for discussion and
thus every contract a government negotiates can be
different down to a definitional level. For a country
lacking the institutional capacity to monitor and enforce a uniform law, properly monitoring and enforcing a range of differing contractual terms is a practical
impossibility. Companies are aware of this, and it may
undermine what little leverage the government may
have.137
Governments need to think strategically in addressing
these challenges during the negotiations. The implementation and administration of mining contracts
can be made easier if the government negotiates terms
that are best suited to its capacities and limitations.138
They should also negotiate for the inclusion of provisions to address key implementation issues such as
requiring periodic auditing by an international auditor
or forensic accounting (at the company’s expense) and
strict penalties.139 The government should also develop
compliance manuals, detailing all of its obligations
under an agreement.140 At the same time, governments
should be developing implementing institutions, such
as Sierra Leone’s National Minerals Agency. This is part
of a long-term process of capacity building, including
bringing professionals to staff the institutions, even if
it requires paying higher rates than other civil servants and offering education support and training to
increase the pool of available domestic skills.141 (Implementation is discussed further later in this paper.)
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Undermining rule of law: Perhaps one of the greatest
problems presented by negotiating contracts is the risk
it creates of hindering the growth, or even actually
undermining the stability, of a country’s legal framework. There is some basis for concern. Negotiating
agreements that depart from, or even supplant the law
upset the hierarchy of law. In situations where the legal
framework is weak or insufficient to properly regulate
the mining sector, agreements often include terms in
the contract provisions that should be enshrined in
the law.142 Not only can this open terms for negotiation
that shouldn’t be, such as environmental protection
provisions, it can also result in the transfer of the
government’s administrative and regulatory responsibilities to the company.143 The government abdicating
its duties to a company creates a situation ripe for
regulatory inaction, thereby preventing needed evolution and undermining trust in an unresponsive and
stagnant legal regime.144
The government maintaining its administrative and
regulatory powers may not bolster the stability of law
either. The terms of many of these agreements put
the government in a difficult position of conflicting
interests: having an interest in the financial success
of a mining project, while simultaneously required to
act as a regulator and enforcer of laws and regulations
that could negatively impact the profits it is hoping to
share. This would be a difficult balance for government
regardless, but even more so in a country where the
weakness of its administrative and regulatory institutions necessitated negotiating agreements in the first
place.145 Even in situations where the government is
successful in balancing these countervailing interests,
the situation creates the risk of being perceived as
favoring companies and profits over enforcing the law.
That can be a significant political risk, particularly
as countries with weak institutions frequently also
experience a lack of confidence in government by the
public. These risks are not limited to government.
Negotiated contracts can be closely linked in content or perception to the officials or government that
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negotiated them.146 Following political turnover, new
governments have found it politically expedient to, or
have had public license to, re-examine the terms of
contracts negotiated by their predecessors.147
Necessary efforts to develop and strengthen the country’s legal regime as well as the government’s administrative and financial management capacities can often
be stymied by a system of negotiated agreements that
prevents coherent treatment of parties and the general
applicability of the law.148
Sanctity of Contract: While drafting and amending
legislation and regulations can be a slow process, laws
are not set in stone and can be amended, repealed, or
supplemented over the course of the life of a mining
project, causing uncertainty as to the terms. To minimize the risk of unfavorable changes in law, particularly to the fiscal provisions, companies may strongly favor stabilization provisions. In a similar vein,
companies may strongly resist government requests
for an amendment to the contract provisions on the
basis that this violates the terms of the deal the parties
negotiated and that both parties should be required to
honor (“sanctity of contract”).149 However, in practice,
while companies may protest when requested to revisit
a provision by their state counterpart, companies are
equally likely, if not more so, to request amendments
to the mining agreements to accommodate the changing circumstances over the life of a mining project.
Contracts, no matter how well drafted, are unlikely
to be adapted to meet all the needs of a multi-decade
project without the flexibility to be amended from
time to time.
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Model Mining
Agreements

29

In response to many of the issues with contracts, there
is a growing trend towards limiting what is negotiable.
Many interviewees argued that the logical conclusion
of this shift is a pure licensing regime where all terms
are set out in legislation and regulations. But that can
be a long process and in the interim an option that
has been gaining a lot of traction as a bridge between
a pure licensing regime and negotiable contracts is a
model mining agreement.150 Indonesia for example
went through a number of generations of model agreements before eventually converting to a pure licensing regime in 2009.151 One senior government official
described a model agreement as “the way forward” for
Sierra Leone, one of a number of countries developing
a model agreement.152
The experts interviewed have found that drafting a
model mining agreement is a faster and easier process
than the typically lengthy process of drafting, enacting or amending the numerous laws and regulations
necessary to create the strong legal framework required
for an effective licensing regime. This is true even if the
model agreement is enacted into law (a practice that is
recommended to allow for parliamentary review and
greater public discussion).153 Liberia’s Model Mineral
Development Agreement is in its Revenue Code.154
The model is similar to a form contract in that it provides the general structure of the agreement and most
terms, all of which are non-negotiable, while including
carefully delimited areas that are open for negotiation, such as royalty rates within a certain range and
community development and work commitments. It
strengthens the government’s position by narrowing
the focus of negotiations. One of the lawyers who
developed the Model Mining Development Agreement,
a collection of example provisions from existing mine
development agreements, pointed out that a smaller
range of negotiable issues that the government team
has to be knowledgeable on helps alleviate the government’s capacity issues. A model agreement that
limits negotiations to the percentage of income tax
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as opposed to the definition of income tax can keep a
government negotiating team from becoming overwhelmed, despairing and then just signing the agreement, something that has been known to happen.
A model agreement can take away a lot of the risk for
inexperienced government teams by restricting the
opportunities for discretion and limiting the impact
of external pressure on the negotiation. It can facilitate faster and more efficient negotiations. A number
of international advisors and government officials
noted that often the most difficult part of negotiations
is reaching internal government consensus. Having
a model agreement can ease that process. They also
provide the opportunity to standardize key terms
across a country’s future agreements, which would
be a significant step towards addressing the capacity
problems exacerbated in many developing countries by
having to implement and monitor different terms for
every project.155
Model agreements give the government the opportunity to present their terms to companies as opposed
to being presented with and negotiating off of the
company’s draft agreement. Working off a company’s
proposal not only starts negotiations from the company’s perspective but uses their terms and definitions,
which can lead to inconsistencies between different
agreements within a country and increase the challenges of administration.156
Having a model mining agreement still requires the
government to possess the political will to require
companies to negotiate based on the model and to
refuse to open the non-negotiable terms up to discussion.157 An effective model agreement has to be well
drafted and has to have the support of government.
Basing negotiations off of a poor model agreement
and/or allowing non-negotiable provisions to be modified as a result of political pressure from the company
can result in the same problems of negotiations that
lack a model.158 These issues, though far from solely
responsible, reportedly contributed to the original,
heavily criticized contract between the government of
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Liberia and Mittal Steel.159 Governments report that
companies presented with model mining agreements
often claim its project is unique and too different to
fit under the model. While there might be certain
extremely large projects that don’t fit within the model
agreement, several interviewed experts believe the vast
majority can be dealt with through it.160 The model is
designed to establish the basic terms while allowing for
the necessary project specifics to be negotiated.161
If given proper government attention a well-drafted
model agreement can be developed relatively quickly.
If contracted to an international expert, it could be
done in as little as a few weeks. If it is a more complex
situation or involves extensive stakeholder engagement, for example, it could take a year or two.162
However, unlike a contract negotiation with a company, there is no pressure on a government to move
quickly to finalize a model agreement, so the process
can take much longer than it should. Even when
unnecessarily lengthy, the development process for a
model agreement is substantially faster and easier than
drafting and enacting the legal framework required for
a licensing regime.163 For this reason, countries might
stop their efforts after finalizing their model mining
agreement and not seek to strengthen their laws.
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Key Terms

32

The comparative review and analysis of the texts in
the legislative and contractual matrices illustrated that
key mining provisions are broadly similar, but their
placement in legislation or agreements often reflects a
country’s legal regime governing mining, underlying
gaps in the law, and the varying motivations behind
the choice to address an issue in an agreement instead
of the law. Even when they are included in mining

KEY PROVISIONS

agreements, the type of agreement used can also vary
depending on a range of factors, including but not limited to the priorities of the country, the era in which
the agreement was signed, the investment climate,
and the political, economic and geographical circumstances of the project. The following sets out the key
provisions related to mining projects as well as how
and where they are typically dealt with in different

LEGISLATION

CONTRACT

Fiscal Provisions
Bonuses

Generally seen in contracts

Royalties

Commonly seen in both

Commonly seen in both

Progressive Fiscal Terms

Starting to be introduced in law

Capital Gains

Commonly seen in both

Tax Exemptions

Poorly suited for contracts

State Participation

Commonly seen in both

Commonly seen in both

Impact Assessments

Seen in both but applied differently

Seen in both but applied differently

Water Rights

Commonly seen in both

Commonly seen in both

Commonly seen in both

Environmental and Social Provisions

Appears more frequently and with
greater detail in contracts

Community Development
Linkages
Procurement

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Training

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Employment

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Technology Transfer

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Value Addition

Basics established in law

Almost always in contracts

Infrastructure

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Third-Party Usage

Basics established in law

Often supplement the law

Other
Term

Generally set in law

Stabilization

Almost always in contracts

Confidentiality

Almost always in contracts

Dispute Resolution

Almost always in contracts

Periodic Review

Almost always in contracts
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regimes. When discussing the inclusion of terms in the
law versus in contracts, those terms that do or should
appear in legislation should be considered relevant to
licensing regimes.

FISCAL PROVISIONS
One of the challenges for a government is designing a
fiscal regime that balances the need to attract foreign
investment with capturing a fair return from the
country’s natural resources. Individual fiscal terms
must be considered in the context of the overall fiscal
regime. Royalties serve a different purpose than
income tax. Some are designed to generate revenue
immediately with the start of production, others, like
income tax can take years to generate revenue for the
government. Some fiscal provisions require higher
levels of administrative capacity than others.
Decisions on the fiscal regime and how to impose it
should be tailored with an understanding of the capabilities of the government to implement and enforce
what are usually quite complex provisions.164 Fiscal
provisions are one of the most likely rationales for a
regime that allows agreements to supplant or amend
existing law. This can be because, for companies, the
fiscal provisions are the priority. According to one
expert, it can also be because generally the most developed law in a developing country is its tax law. For that
same reason, agreements complementing legislated
fiscal terms are less common.165
Royalties: Royalties are unique to resource extraction and traditionally the sector’s primary, and most
controversial, form of taxation.166 In the study countries, royalties have been addressed in both agreements
and legislation. While companies generally think of
royalties as a tax, many countries consider royalties
to be compensation for the company’s right to exploit
and profit from the country’s non-renewable mineral
resources. For that reason, royalties in these countries
tend to be set forth in the mineral laws and overseen
by the ministries responsible for mining. In countries
164
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like Peru and the Philippines that consider royalties a
form of excise tax, royalties are governed by the fiscal
laws and administered by the finance ministries and
the tax collection authorities.167
Enshrining royalty rates in the law can allow countries
to standardize them across all minerals. Some countries, frequently ones with older mining laws, apply
varying royalty rates depending on the mineral. This
approach is based on old sovereignty issues from the
period when the law was enacted and the government
viewed certain minerals as more valuable or more
important to the country than others. A number of
countries with such laws, such as Zambia, have standardized those royalty rates in recent years.168
The critical issue for governments charging royalties is
ensuring an accurate valuation of the minerals being
sold. Mineral sales valuation has proven susceptible to
manipulation through mechanisms such as transfer
pricing, where companies use below-market sales to
affiliated companies to establish an artificially low base
for calculating royalty payments.169 To combat such issues, it is critical for governments to require companies
to sell to affiliated companies at the same prices they
would if it were an “arm’s-length transaction.” Sierra
Leone’s Mines and Minerals Act state:
“[T]he holder of a mineral right shall make sales
commitments to affiliates only at prices based on
or equivalent to arms length sales to non-affiliated
purchasers and in accordance with such terms and
conditions on which agreements would be made if
the parties had not been affiliated.”170
To ensure this occurs governments must establish a
fixed point where valuation should be measured and
ensure that measurement accurately determines the
minerals value. Liberia failed to take these steps in the
rather infamous Mittal Steel agreement, which clearly
illustrates the dangers that can come from negotiating fiscal provisions. Its royalty provision stated: “The
concessionaire shall pay to government in dollars a
royalty at the rate of four point five (4.5%) percent of
167
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the invoiced sales of iron ore FOB Yekepa.” Despite
the reference to the FOB (free on board) price, the
agreement does not specify how the iron ore should be
priced or require an arm’s length transaction, ceding
the power to set the sales price. Since royalties are calculated based on sales price, under the agreement the
company could sell iron ore to an affiliated company
at artificially low prices which would decrease its tax
burden and enable it to pay the government extremely
low royalties.171
Progressive fiscal terms like windfall tax, resource rent
tax: Progressive taxes like sliding scale royalties, windfall
taxes or resource rent taxes are flexible fiscal mechanisms that can self-adjust to fluctuating commodity
prices, and they can ensure that countries participate
in increased profits when commodity prices rise (in the
case of price-based sliding scale royalty or windfall tax)
or when costs decrease and the return increases (in the
case of the Resource Rent Tax (RRT). Such taxes are not
yet common and only recently have countries started
to introduce them in legislation. Licensing regimes such
as Peru and Chile have included progressive taxes as
part of mining law reforms, though Peru has since had
to revisit and refine its approach.172 Thus progressive
fiscal terms are not often seen included in contracts.
Ecuador’s recent Ecuacorriente agreement for example,
simply states the company is bound to the 70% tax on
windfall profits set out in its tax law.173
Capital Gains: Extracting ore is not the only way a
company can profit from a mine. The projects or mineral rights themselves can be an incredibly valuable
asset for a company. In 2011 Rio Tinto bought Riversdale Mining and its coal reserves in Mozambique
for US$ 3.9 billion. Governments are under increased
pressure to ensure that it sees a share of the proceeds
of these sales. In response, countries are increasingly
attempting to impose a tax on capital gains companies
receive from the sale of, or as a result of their rights
to, state mineral assets.174 Some countries impose this
tax through legislation, often tax legislation, such as
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Canada. Burking Faso is considering a new law that
will impose a 20% capital gains tax on any transfer
of mining title.175 The approach of other countries
has been to include provisions in mining agreements
requiring governmental approval of any change of
control of a company with mineral rights, including
indirect changes such as sale of a controlling interest
in an external parent or holding company.176 Recent
agreements in Mongolia and Liberia reviewed for this
study contain capital gains tax provisions.177 Including
such provisions in agreements can be a useful interim
solution to the problem in situations where legislation
on capital gains tax does not exist, but where legislation
does exist, addressing capital gains in an agreement creates an opportunity to negotiate exceptions to the law.
The annex to the Cam Iron Agreement in Cameroon for
example gave the company a three-year exemption to
capital gains tax.178
Signature Bonus: Bonuses are a fiscal element commonly included in negotiated contracts. They are payments of fixed, lump-sum amounts usually triggered
by specific events. The most common are signature
bonuses, paid on the signing of the agreement. These
bonuses are popular with governments but can be
unpopular with companies because they are payable
years before a project becomes profitable, if it ever
does at all. The analysis of legal frameworks found
that a signature bonus is rarely required by law in the
study countries. In Cameroon, where the reviewed law
made no provision for such payments, the 2012 Cam
Iron agreement included a US$ 11 million signature
bonus.179 Even in the rare instances where it is required
by law, such as the DRC, the amount of the bonus is
negotiated in the contract. In the reviewed Manomin
agreement for example, the DRC government required
a US$ 5 million signing bonus.180
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Tax Exemptions: Often, in an effort to attract foreign
investment with a competitive tax regime, governments will include tax incentives in their mining
agreements. These incentives, which might include
tax holidays, loss carryforward rules, and accelerated
depreciation that all decrease the taxable income, can
improve the feasibility of marginal projects and promote investment in exploration. These incentives also,
however, delay the government receiving revenue from
the projects.181
Tax incentives are poorly suited for inclusion in agreements where they are susceptible to the risk of corruption, asymmetrical information, and expertise disparities; instead, they should be incorporated into tax
codes.182 It is estimated that Sierra Leone for example
will lose an average of US$ 44 million per year between
now and 2016 as a result of tax incentives granted to
mining companies.183 The agreements the country
negotiated with the companies London Mining and
African Minerals included favorable departures from
Sierra Leone’s corporate income tax rate.184
State Participation: State involvement in the extraction of its resources has always been an important and
frequently contentious question between governments
and companies that usually requires negotiation.185
State ownership of its resources and the use of national mining companies in the 1960s and 1970s was an
outgrowth of post-colonialism politics. State equity
participation was less of a priority during the era of
privatization without ever going away, and recent years
have seen its return to a prominent position. As governments focus on optimizing the benefits of mining
to spur development, the training, employment, and
technology transfer opportunities provided by state
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equity participation offer an avenue to create economic linkages.186
One way to ensure state participation is through joint
venture agreements. The Manomin JV agreement in
DRC and Aurifere de Guinee in Guinea give the respective government an equity stake in the respective
joint venture company and the opportunity to build
economic linkages. But a country could also acquire a
stake in a company through a non-joint venture negotiated agreement.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
PROVISIONS
Arguably the biggest trend in mining in recent decades
has been the rise to prominence of environmental and
social issues. Mining operations have historically been
associated with significant negative impacts on the
environment. Their social impacts are more complex.
Impact assessments, community development, human
rights, and corporate social responsibility are receiving
increased public scrutiny and are being included in
both mining legislation and contracts.187
Impact Assessments: Almost all study countries
require mining companies either in legislation or in
contracts to conduct some version of an environmental
and social impact assessment (ESIA) as a requirement
for operations. They are a critical part of the project
design phase, identifying potential problems, considering how to mitigate them, and incorporating those
considerations into the project’s planning.
ESIA requirements can be established in domestic legislation or in the mining agreements, and that placement can result in different applications. In a licensing
regime such as Zambia, an EMP or a variation thereof
is a requirement for application and it will be evaluated
as part of the approval process for granting the license.
In contract regimes, the design and requirements of
ESIAs and EMPs are terms to be negotiated and only
conducted after an agreement is concluded, often making them perfunctory exercises.
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ESIA requirements can be included in mining agreements to supplement gaps in the law. For example, in
the Philippines contracts reviewed for this study, the
1992 PSA included an environmental impact requirement. Following the introduction of such provisions in
the 1995 Mining Act, subsequent PSAs did not include
their own impact assessment requirements.188 However, it is not uncommon to see ESIA provisions in both
legislation and agreements in the same jurisdiction.
Including ESIA requirements in an agreement even if
it is already provided for under the law can complement the law and provide an avenue for remedy in the
case of a violation by the company that is not covered
under the ESIA provisions of the law.189
It is also not unusual to find ESIA requirements included in both the environmental and mining law of
a country.190 Sierra Leone’s Environmental Protection
Act (EPA) examined in this study requires environmental impact assessment (EIA) licenses for mining
projects. The completion of an EIA is also one of the
conditions for obtaining a large-scale mining license,
and the EIA must contain “the types of information
and analysis reflecting international mining best practices.”191
Water Rights: Mining projects require a tremendous
amount of water and, if not properly managed, may
have substantial impacts on water resources in their
areas of operation. In regions where water is scarce, a
project’s usage could lower the water table and leave
local communities with inadequate access to water.192
Some agreements address this by simply referring the
company to “pertinent laws, rules and regulations.”193

Mining Act merely states that unless otherwise specified
in the agreement a mineral license gives the company
the right of “use of water and other resources necessary
for the execution of the work.”194 The 2004 agreement
with African Aura Resources, Ltd. builds slightly on
that, allowing the company to “extract as much water
as required so long as it doesn’t deprive the surrounding community from a constant and reasonable water
source.”195 A year later another agreement supplements
the law further limiting the company to the:
“right to remove, extract and use water…provided, however that the [company] shall not deprive
any person of a constant and reasonable supply of
usable water from a previously utilized traditional
source without replacing it…”196
Liberia’s Regulations Governing Exploration Licenses
in 2010 limited companies to using water within the
license area “solely to the extent reasonably necessary
for exploration if the Licensee does so in accordance
with applicable environmental laws,” as well as prohibited companies from depriving “any person (even
temporarily) of a constant and reasonable supply of usable water from a previously utilized traditional source
without replacing it, or interfere with any water rights
enjoyed by any user under any agreement with the
Government.”197 The agreement with Western Cluster
Ltd. the following year again supplemented the new
regulations, expanding and extending them beyond
the exploration stage:
“The company shall not deprive any person of a
constant and reasonable supply of usable water
from or pollute a previously utilized traditional
source without providing an alternative source of
substantially the same quality and quantity, nor
shall the company, without the Minister’s consent
and at least 30 days prior notice to the affected
communities, interfere with any water rights
enjoyed by any user under any agreement with the
government made prior to the date of execution of
this agreement.”198

In some agreements, you can see the water rights provisions in negotiated agreements supplement the law
as the government’s understanding of the issue evolve
over the course of several iterations. Liberia’s 2000
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Even these protections remain insufficient, a company’s use or discharge of water remains conditional on
it adopting the most water efficient management procedures and implementing a mechanism for recycling
or reuse of water, but the example illustrates the role
agreements can play in supplementing the provisions
of a legal regime that is by nature slower to develop.199
Community Development Agreements: In an effort
to ensure that local and affected communities see
some benefit from the mining projects, countries are
increasingly requiring companies to sign community
development agreements (CDAs) and sometimes to
establish community development funds. While provisions requiring CDAs can be included in either law or
mining agreements, in the contract regime countries
examined, the detailed terms and provisions these
separate agreements need to include were much more
frequently detailed in the mining agreements. 200 In
some countries with strong licensing regimes and indigenous populations, including Canada and Australia,
the law requires consultation with the indigenous
communities and allows companies to negotiate directly with, and make fund payments directly to, these
communities. 201 For those countries, these agreements
are rare instances of negotiations in otherwise strict
licensing-based regimes. 202

ECONOMIC LINKAGES AND LOCAL
CONTENT
In the last decade, the idea that mining should be an
engine of broad-based growth and development has
reemerged. As laid out in the African Mining Vision, the
key to this broad development is optimizing its linkages
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to local economies.203 Instead of focusing on maximizing government revenue from mining, countries should
focus on obtaining optimal benefits. In this strategy,
governments can sacrifice some short-term fiscal benefits for medium-to-long-term non-fiscal benefits. In this
context, the ability to negotiate, if done correctly, can be
quite beneficial in giving the governments the flexibility
to optimize economic linkages.204
One way to optimize a mining operation’s linkages to
local economies is through local content provisions.
They aim to develop a competitive local workforce,
create employment opportunities for citizens, facilitate
the transfer of technology, and advance the domestic
private sector. 205 The need to grow the desired economic linkages while maintaining the economic viability
of different projects can require a level of flexibility
difficult to achieve solely in generally applicable law.
As discussed above, local content provisions need to
be specific to the project, and a number of experts and
government officials interviewed believe that negotiated agreements can complement generally applicable
laws with more detailed provisions. 206
Employment: A case in point comes from the Philippines: In the Philippines, the Mining Act requires companies to give preference to qualified Filipino citizens.
PSAs like Mt. Sinai and Vincent Tan Tiong go further
in requiring their companies to create time-tables for
achieving certain percentages of Filipino citizens at all
levels of employment. 207
Training: To achieve the local employment requirements, most of the agreements in this study also include requirements for the training of nationals. These
requirements, which typically include creation of a
plan for training and promotion of staff, and requirements that the company replace expatriate staff with
local employees who have completed that training, are
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often negotiated in agreements. 208 The minimum annual expenditures for training when required are often
set in agreements. 209
Technology Transfer: In the study countries, technology transfer provisions appear much more frequently
in contracts than in the reviewed legislation. Joint
venture agreements are by design particularly suited to
encourage technology transfer.
Procurement: Local procurement provisions are often
dealt with in agreements. The success of these provisions
is dependent on solid drafting. The definition of what
are “best efforts”, what constitutes a contractor, a good
or service from that country, or what is meant by “local”
and “competitive” must be carefully defined to avoid
questions of interpretation and ensure the appropriate
parties benefit. This is an area where countries could
benefit from model mining agreements that ensure such
key terms are well defined and standardized. 210

the economic benefits, but they can be very expensive
operations with very low-profit margins, making them
economically unfeasible in many cases.213 They are also
very project specific and so are generally dealt with in
agreements where they can be contentious negotiation
points. One executive recounted his company’s “endless” debates with the government in Liberia that was
advocating for local beneficiation provisions during negotiations. The two sides ultimately agreed to a requirement that the company undertake a feasibility study.214
Liberia’s agreement with Western Cluster Ltd. for an
iron ore mine included a representative provision illustrating the specificity required for value-addition:
“The Company will work towards and assist the
Government in achieving the policy of the establishment or expansion of downstream metals
processing facilities in Liberia in relation to pelletization or other further beneficiation, refining
and/or metals manufacturing and fabricating (to
the extent not already carried out by the Company pursuant to an approved Feasibility Report)
if, in light of recognized economic, technical and
scientific standards, the Iron Ore mined by the
Company is amenable to such additional activities
and provided it is economically and practically feasible to do so…

Addressing these provisions in agreements can create
problems for countries that are members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), as the national treatment
obligation clause of the WTO prevents foreign companies from being forced to purchase local goods or
services if a better quality or priced alternative exists
outside the country. Local procurement provisions
in those countries often only require preferential
treatment and do not or cannot specify sanctions for
noncompliance. 211

Within five years of first production the Company
must finance a pre-feasibility study for the establishment in Liberia of a facility for the next value
added step in the transformation of Iron Ore into
steel. “Value added” means at a minimum both an
increase in value and an increase in purity (grade)
of the Product(s) of the Company’s Mine(s). If at
the time of the study the parties cannot agree on
the appropriate next value addition step or steps,
the parties will select an international expert in
iron and steel production to define the appropriate
focus of the pre-feasibility study, with the costs of
such expert to be shared equally by the Government and the Company.”215

Value Addition: Most local content provisions are
“upstream” linkages, designed to incorporate local
involvement in mining and mine supporting operations.
But local content also includes “downstream” linkages
designed to provide value addition to the raw materials
being mined.212 Beneficiation and other value addition
activities are attractive to governments because of
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Infrastructure: One of the biggest challenges to mining in developing countries is infrastructure. 216 Largescale mining projects have tremendous infrastructure
demands to bring heavy machinery, equipment, supplies, and staff to the mining site and mined ore from
the site. Transportation infrastructure including roads,
railways, airstrips or even seaports might be required.
There will be tremendous energy, water, communications and other logistical needs. Frequently, little
of this is available at often remote mining sites at the
beginning of projects. If it does not exist or is not in
usable shape, it will have to be built or refurbished. 217
As discussed above, due to the unique infrastructure
needs of each project and their significant scale and
costs, infrastructure was regularly cited by interviewees as frequently needing the flexibility and specificity
provided by mining agreements. 218 In some instances,
separate infrastructure agreements are required to
supplement the mining license. In Mozambique, the
Moatize coal mine was put out for tender separately
from the tender for the project to construct a railway
to transport the coal. This separation can be problematic however, and has caused severe logistical constraints for the Moatize mine. 219
As explained above, third-party access to infrastructure is another instance where agreements are often
negotiated to supplement the law. One way to increase
economic linkages is to require companies to give third
parties the right to access certain infrastructure to the
extent that it does not interfere with the companies’
operations. Governments can even mandate certain
routes for roads or railroads or locations for infrastructure such as power plants to increase its benefit
for third parties. 220 The agreement between Ivanhoe
Mines and the government of Mongolia provides for
third party access to certain public use infrastructure/
services including, “roads, power, water/heating systems, water drawing facilities…schools, hospitals…an
airport [and] community centers.” Ivanhoe is allowed
to recover the costs of this access by charging tolls for

its usage.221 Some companies have argued that having
to share infrastructure with third parties who may
have different standards for usage and maintenance
can jeopardize a company’s supply chains, and in some
agreements, they still negotiate for an exclusive right to
use and to decide who else may use infrastructure it has
constructed.222 The very specific nature of these rights
and how they might benefit third parties require agreements, but the conflicting priorities of the company
and the government on this provision can result in very
lengthy negotiations.223 The agreement for the Simandou iron ore project in Guinea took a number of years,
in part due to negotiations over the 650km railway and
deep-sea port the project required and their availability
for third-party access.224

OTHER PROVISIONS
Term: The duration of a mining agreement is typically either for a set period of time as established in the
agreement or by legislation, or for the economic life of
the mine. DRC has done both, awarding licenses for the
life of the mine in its joint venture projects, and using
fixed terms in its mineral agreements. 225 The purpose
of both systems is to offer companies a sufficiently
long period to allow it to recoup its investment and
make a profit. 226
In study countries, fixed terms, which are more widely
used and decreasing in length, are usually set in the
mining laws or regulations. In the only country where
agreements included a different length of term than
in the legislation, Afghanistan, the law allowed for
exploitation licenses for up to 30 years initially and the
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agreements under that law actually restricted it to an
initial 10 years. 227
Stabilization clauses: Stabilization provisions, which
are discussed in a previous section on when contracts
are used, are largely unique to contracts. Unlike other
key terms, interest in its inclusion is almost exclusive
to companies and can be one of their primary motives
in seeking a contract. In a few rare cases such as Chile
and Peru, the legal framework provides for the possibility of stabilization clauses that supplement the law
in exchange for higher tax or royalty rates. 228

mechanisms can also sometimes be set out in investment treaties, agreements between states setting out
terms and conditions for investment by the companies
of one country in the other. 232
Periodic Review: As discussed above, periodic review
provisions are an obligation imposed on the parties
to meet on a regular basis, upon request of one of the
parties or following a trigger event. While this type of
provision can be set in law in Tanzania, if it is included
in contracts it can be more detailed, specifying the
trigger events and the variables to be adjusted to adapt
to the change in circumstances.

Confidentiality: To this point, confidentiality provisions have generally been addressed in contracts not
legislation. As transparency increases, countries are
approaching it in different ways. Some countries, including Liberia and Mozambique now require contract
disclosure in legislation. Other countries prefer including clauses requiring public disclosure of contracts in
the contracts themselves that can then be ratified. 229
The latter solution is seen as a quicker solution than
passing a transparency law or amending an existing
law.
Dispute Resolution: Dispute resolution mechanisms
such as international arbitration (which is discussed in
greater detail later in this paper) are generally seen in
contract regimes where they are addressed in mining
agreements. It is more often addressed there instead of
in legislation because typically it is the company which
desires its inclusion. This is common in developing
countries where a company is concerned about the
competence and independence of its judicial system. 230
The mining acts in Liberia and Mozambique, as well as
the proposed new mining law in Afghanistan reviewed
for this study, all expressly defer to the contracts to set
their own dispute mechanisms. 231 Dispute resolution
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The Negotiation
Experience

42

This section of the report examines the experience of
preparing for, negotiating, drafting, and implementing
mining contracts and legislation. It includes information drawn from 44 interviews with 39 government
officials, company representatives, external advisors,
and civil society members on their experiences in the
entire process of negotiating mining contracts in 18

countries. The report examines negotiation preparation activities such as the building of the negotiating
teams and consultations with stakeholders. It reviews
the negotiation itself, including points of contention
within the agreement and issues that affect negotiations. Post-negotiation issues, such as implementation
and monitoring, renegotiation, the use of model agree-

AN EXAMPLE OF A MINING CONTRACT NEGOTIATION FROM
A CORPORATE P
 ERSPECTIVE
An executive who led the company team during the
negotiation of an iron ore project in a West African
country in the late-2000s related his experience:
The government had a large negotiation team that was
well advised and was working off of a model development agreement. Nevertheless, negotiations were slow
and lasted almost two years. It took a year to get the
government to engage fully with the company and have
concrete talks. Following three months of negotiation,
there was a six-month period with little progress or
communication, followed by another two months of
negotiation before there was an agreement. This was
highly problematic for the company because it was conducting exploration during these negotiations for the
mining concession, and the longer the process took, the
more the company was spending on exploration with
no guarantee of reaching an agreement.
In part, the slow pace of negotiations was the result
of several factors. The government’s negotiating team
included seven government ministers or equivalent
officials. They were frequently distracted or called
away by their other responsibilities. Capacity was also a
problem, but this was mitigated to some degree by the
government retaining experienced external advisors. On
some points the company consulted with those advisors
directly before negotiating with the government which
made the process easier. The company had prepared
for the negotiation by determining its opening positions and how far it would move on key issues. With
that mandate, the company’s negotiating team came
in with a fair amount of discretion. The government’s
team did not have that same mandate.The power-centric
approach to politics in the country and a lack of trust
between officials on the government team restricted the

team’s authority to agree to terms. The government’s
negotiation team also excluded representatives from
the region where the project was located. Local leaders
were so frustrated by their exclusion that they actually
reached out to the company to ask for a seat at the table.
Another obstacle was the short-term focus of both sides.
Individual government officials were seeking to secure
political capital and company negotiators wanted to
please their superiors by “winning” the negotiation. That
approach requires a “loser” which undermines the long
term prospects for the agreement. Approaching it as a
partnership would have been better.
There were several particular points of contention during the negotiations. The first centered on local beneficiation, which is frequently an issue during negotiations
around iron ore. The other was over periodic review of
the agreement. From the company’s perspective, negotiation is an uncertain, expensive, and time-consuming
process that generates unnecessary uncertainty for its
investment. The company neither wants nor sees the
need to repeat that process in only a few years. Instead,
the company preferred a pre-agreed to sliding-scale
royalty or windfall tax.
Once the negotiations concluded and project operations
began, the company did not refer to the agreement at
all as so much of it concerned future goals that would
not be relevant for the project for some time. The government came under heavy criticism for the deal and
the general public perception was that it conceded too
much.233
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ments and the question of external assistance, are also
considered.

PREPARING FOR CONTRACT
NEGOTIATIONS
While the term “negotiation” tends to evoke images of
people arguing across a long table (an essential aspect of
any negotiation), the majority of the negotiation process
is spent doing equally (if not more) important work in
advance away from the table, including but not limited
to conducting research and studies, drafting terms, reviewing the other side’s proposed terms, and achieving
internal consensus. Ideally, for governments and companies, walking into the negotiating room should be the
culmination of many months or even years of advance
work, and if the parties successfully reach an agreement,
that is just the start of the work of implementation.234
In many instances however, negotiations end in flawed
agreements that are not in the interests of the country,
precisely because the necessary preparatory work for
negotiations, including feasibility studies and asset evaluations, was not carried out by the government.
Ideally, from a company perspective, unless it is negotiating an agreement for a surveyed or established
mineral deposit, it generally will have spent a considerable amount of time and resources merely determining if there is even something to negotiate over. The
company must conduct airborne geophysical surveys,
mapping, and seismic analysis, often under reconnaissance permits, even just to identify potential sites for
deeper exploration. 235
If a mineral deposit is found, best practice, according
to corporate representatives interviewed for this study,
would have the company’s project development team
step in and conduct pre-feasibility and feasibility studies. The company would need financial analyses, including the development of a financial model that predicts
the return on investment at different commodity prices.
Mine design and site risks would need to be considered.
Mining projects – particularly in developing countries
– tend to operate in an enclave where they supply their
own power, water, transport and ICT infrastructure,

but a project that might require a substantial additional
infrastructure component, such as railways or a port for
the export of bulk commodities, introduces additional
complexities and requires even more analysis.236 The
company would need to understand the political interests of the government, particularly the ruling party, as
well as the political environment.237 In an ideal scenario
the company would also conduct social, environmental
and human rights impact assessments to understand
and mitigate such risks. Realistically speaking, companies generally only conduct such assessments if required
by law or internal company policy. Human rights impact assessments are particularly rare.238
On the other side, in an ideal scenario, the government
would be performing its own due diligence during this
time. It is not enough to have a potential investor in
the country’s mining sector; it needs to be the right
kind of investor. 239 Taking the time and effort to target
and attract a world class investor with a history of
success and a strong environmental, health and human
rights track-record can be quite a political dilemma
for a developing country. On one hand, as is often the
case, it is in desperate need of the investment, development, employment opportunities and revenue that
can come from mining and its government can be
under intense political pressure to deliver those results.
On the other hand simultaneously, weak institutions,
political instability, recent past conflicts, or rumors of
widespread corruption often mean that the country
is considered high-risk, and as such is only attracting
high-risk investors, junior companies, or companies
with questionable records. Caught in this catch-22, it
is tempting for a government to go after the quick resource flows and make a deal with the first company to
arrive, setting a potentially dangerous precedent. The
early investors and initial agreements set the tone for
the sector and the wrong companies playing significant roles in the mining sector can attract more of the
same and discourage responsible investors. 240
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If the company did not provide the necessary information in the process of seeking a license, the government
should investigate the company’s past experience,
expertise, finances, environmental and human rights
records, etc. Best practice would have it require the
company to share its feasibility report. 241 The goal is
to uncover anything that could potentially prevent a
company from fulfilling its obligations. This exercise
is particularly important for small junior companies
or privately-held company suitors whose record is not
as transparent or well documented as publicly-listed
companies. This research can, and often is, done by
the government itself, but thorough due diligence can
be a complex process, and governments often lack the
necessary expertise and capacity. In such cases governments could choose to hire outside firms that specialize in such investigations. 242

CONSULTATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS
In addition to these preparations, many of those interviewed emphasized that both sides should consult
with other stakeholders, particularly sub-national
governments, CSOs and local communities in the area
of the proposed project. There is increasing international recognition that local communities must be
consulted and made part of public decisions that will
affect them, and the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) protects the right of indigenous
peoples to also be consulted on matters that can affect
their interests. 243 Governments and companies should
ideally continue this engagement throughout the
process, though this is frequently reported not to be
the case. While on rare occasions CSOs might be in the
negotiating room – Afghanistan EITI was present as
an observer during past negotiations – most likely the
opportunity for local communities, indigenous peoples, and CSOs to make their concerns heard will come
during pre-negotiation consultations. 244 A civil society
representative noted that the government engaged
with them in advance of negotiations for a mining
agreement. However, despite the CSO’s efforts to have
local communities included in the actual negotiations,

they were not consulted in any way during talks, nor
did the government or the company come back after
the deal was completed to inform the people what was
agreed to. 245
Not only are consultations critical to achieving FPIC
from communities, they are also an important step in
setting reasonable expectations for the timeline and
revenue of a project. Increasing expectations of the
benefits that will come from a mining project is an
issue companies and governments should be very sensitive to, as failure to achieve unrealistic expectations
can create resentment towards both the government
and the company. 246 Frequently however, what happens
are overly optimistic predictions by credit seeking
politicians or company statements to shareholders that
only serve to inflate public expectations. 247
Despite their importance there is considerable variance
in whether and how consultations are conducted in
the countries studied. The government in the Philippines, for example, holds consultations with the
public, local government units and indigenous people (when projects are located in or around ancestral
land). In Burkina Faso, the government goes to local
communities to discuss the mine and the development plan with them. But in a number of surveyed
countries, consultations were not done at all. 248 Civil
society organizations “Mining Contracts: How to Read
and Understand Them,” (Creative Commons, 2013), p.
109. “Mining Contracts: How to Read and Understand
Them,” (Creative Commons, 2013), p. 109. in Azerbaijan
report that neither the government nor the companies
consult with them at any point in the negotiation process. Often in past negotiations in Mozambique, local
communities were not involved which had a negative
effect on subsequent interactions between companies
and local communities as well as subsequent negotiations for other mining projects. 249
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BUILDING A NEGOTIATION TEAM
One of the most significant decisions in the negotiation
process is determining the composition of the negotiating teams. 250 The structure of the government’s team
can vary significantly, depending on the importance
of the project, the complexity of the agreement, and/or
the country’s governance structure. Typically government teams are led by the ministry responsible for
mining, an inter-ministerial commission (IMC) or the
national mining company, if it exists. 251
An IMC generally includes high-level representatives
of relevant ministries responsible for finance, environment, economic planning, and labor. Ideally, members
should have experience working together and on multiple negotiations. The team in Liberia negotiating its
major mining licenses is led by the Minerals Technical
Committee, giving it the authority to make high-level
decisions during negotiations. In Sierra Leone, a Minerals Advisory Board advises the Minister. 252 Cameroon
has a similar structure comprised of a strategic counsel
for negotiating mining contracts that includes political
and technical units. Ministers sit on the political unit,
technical advisors sit on the other, and six or seven
ministries can be represented at a negotiation. 253 Some
advisors would suggest it is best that the leader of
the negotiating team or the IMC not be a minister or
other political appointee, but the leader does need to
be someone with access to, and the full support of, the
head of government. 254
Even when not led by an IMC, the government team
can be expected to include representatives from mining-related ministries including Justice, Finance, and
Strategic Planning. Ideally the ministries of Environment, Labor, and the National Investment Commission (where they exist) would also be included. 255 Best
practice would include a representative from every
ministry that will be affected by the agreement in
the negotiating team. The result can often be a large
negotiating team which can create problems includ250
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INTERVIEWEES’ RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES
FOR GOVERNMENTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
– Negotiating team, especially the team leader, must
have the full support and confidence of the head of
government
– Team leader should not be a minister or other political appointee. Better if led by an experienced civil
servant
– Team should include representatives from every
ministry the contract will involve
– Government team should have experience working
together and should stay together to oversee implementation
– Government should be willing to invest in hiring
expert assistance
– Government must do its homework on its mineral
resources and the company
– Negotiations should take place in the host country
and in a language with which the government team
is comfortable
– Include local lawyers in the team to get experience
and be trained by the outside advisors
– Government should draft agreement so they are
clear what was agreed to
– Set negotiation timetable
– Get access to the data used in the company’s feasibility study

ing confusion, internal conflict and a divided front at
the negotiating table. For that reason, some countries
prefer to have a larger advisory team when preparing
for negotiations, but keep the actual negotiation team
itself small.
Best practices would be for the government’s negotiating and/or advisory teams to meet shortly before
meeting with the company to go over key points and
its national negotiating position. The Cameroonian
government uses these meetings to set its priorities
and its non-negotiable terms, for example. 256 This
should take into account the stakeholder consultations,
impact assessments, feasibility studies, and the differing priorities and positions of all the relevant govern-
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”Government Official.” Telephone interview. 17 March 2015.

ment ministries and agencies. 257 This might involve
30-40 people in a room discussing negotiation strategy.
This process is important not just for achieving consensus on the issues before going into the negotiating
room and identifying areas where more information or
assistance is necessary, but also for getting buy-in from
the other government agencies. Having broad-based
inter-governmental support from the outset can prevent the development of opposition to the agreement
within government. 258
The company on the other side of the table is simultaneously putting together its team. Similarly, interviewed corporate representatives highlighted the
amount of variation in the composition and size of the
negotiating team, depending on the company involved,
its relationship to the government and the size of the
project. Small projects involving junior companies
might involve a team of only five or less, just one or
two business development or strategy specialists including the financial modeler, the company’s in-country representative, a lawyer, and possibly a technical
person (geologist, infrastructure expert, etc.). 259 Situations where the scope for negotiation is fairly limited,
such as World Bank or IFC auction leading to an agreement, the small team might be all that is necessary. 260
Teams for larger projects might also include engineers,
economists, the company’s country manager, marketing and finance advisors and legal teams including
both in-house and outside counsel. 261 Some companies
will also include community relations and corporate
social responsibility specialists. 262 Depending on how
important the company considers the project to be,
it might also include high-level corporate representatives, even the CEO. The negotiations for the license
for the Moatize coal mine in Mozambique, for example,
involved 20 people spread out between Mozambique
and the company’s home office. 263
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CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
It is only after all of those preparations are concluded
that both sides commence the actual negotiation process. The process should take place in the host country
and both negotiations and drafts of the agreement
should be in a language with which the government
team is comfortable. 264 The two sides will spend comparatively little time in actual/face-to-face contract
negotiations. Once the process starts, frequently with
the company responding to the government’s proposed
draft mining agreement circulated in advance of the
first negotiation session, days of negotiation might be
interspersed over months while drafts are exchanged
and reviewed, new drafts are developed, and internal
consensus or approval sought. 265 Interviewees frequently cited several issues as particular points of contention that have held up or dominated negotiations.
These include: stabilization, royalties and other fiscal
provisions and state participation.
The first and most often referenced source of contention between the parties relates to stabilization
provisions. Governments have a clear interest in
limiting the scope of stabilization clauses. Such clauses
can reduce a country’s ability to respond to economic
and political developments. For companies, stabilization clauses provide assurance against their investment
being subject to unpredictable legal, regulatory or
political changes that could affect the commercial viability of the project, such as a change in the applicable
level of tax on a project. 266 From a company perspective
it can also serve as protection, as the bargaining power
shifts from companies in the early stages when governments are anxious for investment, to the governments as a project develops and the company commits
large amounts of capital which cannot be withdrawn
from the country. 267 It is in the interests of both parties
to keep stabilization clauses narrowly focused on fiscal
provisions and limited in time and scope, typically just
long enough for the company to recoup the costs of its
investment plus a reasonable return on that investment. Overbearing stabilization clauses can actually

264
265

266

267

“International Advisor 1.” Telephone interview. 22 April 2015.
“Corporate Executive.” Telephone interview. 19 March 2015;
Mining Guide
Negotiation Support: Glossary, available at http://negotiationsupport.org/glossary/stabilization-clause (last visited 31 March
2015).
Otto, “Mining Royalties,” 2006, op. cit., p. 82.

47

undermine the stability of the overall agreement and
force renegotiation when they are too restrictive on a
government’s ability to implement important or necessary policy changes. 268
Periodic review provisions, usually time-based though
occasionally triggered by certain specified events, are
increasingly being seen. 269 A five-year review provision
was included in Liberia’s mining contracts. Periodic
review can provide some flexibility. It is an acknowledgement that changes occur over the course of a
project and allows for review of the agreement in light
of current circumstances to see if any renegotiation
is necessary. While companies are quick to request
renegotiation when it is in their interest, they tend
not look favorably upon a periodic review mechanism
that provides governments with a similar opportunity.
Most see it as undercutting the security of the deal and
creating the possibility of having to repeat a time- and
resource-consuming negotiation process again just a
few years later. 270 As one company representative put
it, “[Periodic review] makes a mockery of the two years
they spent negotiating the original deal.”271 Corporate reception to the provision improves if the period
between reviews is extended or is triggered by certain
events, such as mineral prices exceed a certain range. 272
The other most frequently invoked points of contention were aspects of the fiscal provisions aside from
the stabilization issue, particularly royalties. It was
regularly described as the area where negotiators spent
the most time. 273 Discussions typically are more complex than merely setting a royalty rate, for example.
The mineral valuation process on which royalties are
based can be susceptible to manipulation if not well
drafted. Governments frequently lack a clear understanding of the size and grade of mineral deposits, as
well as the experience or capacity to build their own
financial models or analyze those of the companies,
putting them at a distinct disadvantage in this area of
negotiations.

Another regularly invoked issue was state participation,
via paid equity, carried equity or free carry.274 Project
schedules and time frames for development were also
mentioned. From the company perspective, governments always want a more aggressive schedule. But
if you start with an impossible schedule you are only
creating the basis for future problems.275 Other regularly cited provisions include the details of local content,
such as fixed percentages and schedules, local beneficiation, and third party access to infrastructure.276

ISSUES AFFECTING NEGOTIATIONS
Disagreement over specific clauses is just one of the
issues that can hinder negotiations and undermine
efforts to reach an agreement. Respondents raised a
number of issues many governments face that have
negatively impacted negotiations, including:
Capacity: According to many of those interviewed, despite the economic scale of mining most countries do
not understand the industry or the market. One lawyer
described the lack of understanding of basic concepts
in his conversations with government officials as
“mind-blowing.”277 They are often inexperienced and
lacking basic understanding of all areas of the process.
Advice is needed on everything from the composition
of the negotiating team to how commodity markets
work. 278 It is not unheard of for a government to have
to rely entirely on the technical information provided
by the company or try and repurpose existing contracts no matter how ill-suited because it lacks the
expertise to conduct its own review of the data or draft
the appropriate contracts. 279 The problem is not limited
to developing countries; even countries with significant mining experience can fail to recognize basic
concepts. Australia, for example introduced a mining
super profits tax right as the most recent mineral
boom was going bust. 280 The money never came, and it
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contributed to the downfall of Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd. 281 These problems do not just affect governments; companies have an interest in an organized
and experienced negotiating partner. Not only does
it decrease the cost and length of negotiations, the
better prepared and supported the government side is,
the better the chances of the government being a true
partner and the agreement being implemented and
complied with. 282
A common issue that contributes to the capacity problem in developing countries is personnel turnover in
government. 283 This can be due to financial constraints,
political instability, or trust issues between the government and its advisors, but it can be difficult to build a
tenable agreement when one side of the negotiation is
constantly changing. 284 Guinea is an excellent example.
During one negotiation the government went through
three legal advisors, and another company representative worked with four presidents and eight ministers
of mining in his time in the country. 285 At other times,
companies themselves can create the turnover. It is not
unheard of for companies to hire away members of the
government negotiating team during negotiations. Not
only can this strengthen the company’s position in negotiations by undermining the government’s, the newly hired employee brings with him inside knowledge
of the government’s negotiation strategy. Given most
companies’ ability to offer higher wages, this migration
of talent from government can continue throughout
the life of the project. This can have a discouraging effect on the government investing resources in training
and capacity building. 286 Retaining external advisors is
one option to help address these issues, but that comes
with another set of issues discussed in a later section.
Decision-making Authority: The discretion given to
company representatives in negotiations varies but
they usually go in with a mandate. 287 It is not efficient
for representatives to constantly refer back to their
head office on when to move on to various provisions,
so, frequently, the company’s opening position, how
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far it is willing to go on certain terms, and its priority
issues have been agreed to internally before negotiations commence. 288
The decision making authority of the government’s
team is not always as clear. In Afghanistan, when
negotiators couldn’t reach consensus on certain provisions, they went to the IMC to make a decision. 289 In
Liberia, the president is responsible for clearing serious
disagreements. 290 These processes can add to the duration and uncertainty of negotiations.
For that reason, and to avoid decision paralysis that
can come from having an insufficiently empowered
negotiating team, some countries have their minister or an IMC lead their negotiations to ensure that
there is decision making authority in the room. That
solution can frequently create its own problems. A
government official sufficiently high-ranking to have
decision making authority can often be less informed
on the project and sometimes unwilling to listen to the
input of his technical advisors. 291 Negotiating with an
IMC can mean negotiating with six or seven ministers.
It is impossible to take people on that level away from
their other work for the length of the negotiation, so
talks were hampered by constant distractions. 292 Another issue with IMCs is the frequent lack of trust and
conflicting personal interests between its members. It
is not always easy for a politically sensitive minister
to do what he sees as sacrificing political capital by
making a concession in exchange for a benefit that will
go to another ministry. 293
One negotiator saw success in Guinea using a working
group composed solely of business and development
representatives from the company and officials from
the relevant government ministries, no lawyers. By
leaving the lawyers out of the early stages they kept
the discussion focused solely on the business issues
not legal issues and the phrasing of terms. Only once
the group reached an agreement in principle did they
bring in the lawyers. 294 Even then, discussions were
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led by the principals not the lawyers. 295 In fact, this
particular negotiation did not work off written agreements at all during the talks. Instead, they created
tables aligning their positions for comparison. In this
situation where the government speaks French and the
company English it also facilitated quicker negotiations by largely avoiding the expensive and time-consuming process of constantly translating new drafts of
the contract. 296

External pressures are not limited to politicians:
Donors: International organizations have their
own political agendas, ranging from promoting
neo-liberal economic models to opposing Chinese
investment, and can use their influence as donors
to push those agendas. As donor country aid
agencies are increasingly incorporated into their
foreign ministries, their aid and advice is increasingly politicized and potentially not always in the
receiving government’s interest.301

External Pressures: Another big concern around negotiation is external influences. Negotiations do not take
place in a vacuum, and due to the enormous financial
interests and policy issues involved, the negotiating
teams on both sides of the table are frequently operating under various pressures from the public and their
superiors, politicians and rival companies. This creates
myriad opportunities for corruption, political interference, and decision paralysis.
A good, multidisciplinary government negotiating
team, with representatives from all the relevant agencies and with all the necessary technical support can
still be completely undermined by political interference. 297 A review of the Western Garmack coal mine
and Qara Zaghan gold mine in Afghanistan revealed
clear signs of political interference in the tendering
processes, issuing of contracts, and mine operations,
all favoring inexperienced bidders. 298 An official in
Sierra Leone related an incident where the National
Minerals Agency negotiated an agreement only for the
President’s Chief of Staff to get involved and by the
time the agreement reached the President for signature
the terms had been changed. 299In another instance the
premature end of discussions of a possible renegotiation of a mining agreement was attributed to the close
relationship between the CEO of Sierra Rutile Ltd. and
high-ranking members of the Sierra Leonean government.300
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The Public: While negotiations should be a transparent process, and the public should have some
level of input, ultimately, the negotiation team
should consider those views and then decide
what is best for the country. If it is too public, it
can paralyze negotiations. As one international
advisor put it, “You don’t want to negotiate in an
auditorium.”302
Other Companies: Companies competing for
the same project can make extravagant claims in
an effort to win the deal, in the process creating
unrealistic demands from government negotiators.303
Timetable: Unsurprisingly, the time it takes to conclude a negotiation varies wildly. They can take
anywhere from 1-2 weeks to 18-24 months.304 Negotiations that include infrastructure projects generally
are reported to be more complicated and take longer. 305
The timeline can have serious implications and several
corporate representatives emphasized the increased
risk that results from prolonged negotiations. The
longer they continue, the greater the chances that
circumstances change and what was previously seen
as a reasonable outcome is now perceived differently
by at least one of the parties. This can result in renegotiating previously agreed to terms which erodes
credibility and makes for an inefficient process.306 This
can be particularly problematic when a company is
already operating under an exploration license and has
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to make decisions on further investment without the
certainty of a concluded agreement for development. 307

AFTER NEGOTIATION: IMPLEMENTATION
AND MONITORING
While the contract negotiation process tends to receive
significant attention and effort from government
and donors, insufficient time and resources are spent
preparing for negotiations and implementing and
monitoring the signed agreement. 308 The best drafted
agreement, with the most advantageous terms will do
a government little good if it is not properly implemented and monitored. The government needs to map
out the obligations and commitments in the agreement
and relevant legislation.309 It must commit to managing its relationship and staying in regular communication with the company and local communities. There
must be coordination between the various ministries
and agencies responsible for ensuring that both the
government and the company fulfill their contractual
commitments.310 There needs to be a strong inspectorate that regularly visits project sites, enforces mining
and environmental regulations and assists in conflict
resolution.311 The government needs to conduct regular
audits of production, export volumes, mineral valuations and cost calculations.
Yet governments tend to face even more severe capacity restraints when it comes to the necessary technical and monitoring capabilities necessary to oversee
a project and ensure a company complies with its
obligations. Institutional capacity building is a regular
concern for companies who want efficient and reliable counterparts.312 These issues can be compounded
by the fact that all too often on the government side,
those responsible for overseeing implementation are
not the same as those who were in the negotiations. 313
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This can even lead to situations where the authorities
lack knowledge of the terms and agreements they are
responsible for implementing.314 One best practice
suggested by interviewees is to have the same technical
staff (not subject to political cycles) who were on the
government team which negotiated an agreement, be
in charge of its implementation. 315
The dangers of this lack of capacity are readily apparent. In Afghanistan, under contracts reviewed for this
study, the Khoshak Brothers Company and Afghan
Krystal Natural Resources Company did not provide
the government with the required documentation for
their respective projects, including ESIAs. There are
reports that both companies are extracting minerals
under exploration licenses yet effective inspections of
the projects have not occurred and they have not been
held accountable for the little to no taxes and royalties
being made to the government. 316 In Liberia, a mining
agreement obligated the government to establish a
committee, to allocate the community development
funds paid by the company between the three affected
regions. The committee was never established and the
funds paid by the company were never spent. 317
Governments can take steps to address the issues with
implementation, many of which they will encounter
under a licensing regime as well as with contracts. The
government’s capacity, or lack thereof, for oversight
should be taken into account when developing the
agreement. The terms chosen cannot simply be the
best terms; they need to be the terms that will work
best given the abilities and limitations of that country.
This could mean choosing certain fiscal provisions that
are easier to administer over ones that are theoretically
more lucrative.318 “Renting” capacity is another option.
While it can be a difficult process politically to fit in
the budget, external assistance can be hired. Angola,
for example, uses international auditors for the government audits of the country’s oil leases. 319 In some
situations, the costs of hiring external assistance, such
as the hiring of a technical expert to monitor compli314
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ance with mine closure requirements at the company’s
expense, can be included in the contract. 320 The other
benefit of contracting assistance is that it avoids the
serious challenge of retaining trained staff encountered by many developing governments.321 In the
longer-term, governments will need to devote effort
and attention to developing implementing institutions,
such as Sierra Leone is doing with its National Minerals Agency, and building their capacity.

RENEGOTIATIONS AND ARBITRATION
It is inevitable that circumstances and conditions
that were the basis for the original terms will change
over the life of the agreement. Unanticipated changes
in market conditions and commodity prices could
fundamentally change the investment landscape and
the fairness of the agreed-upon terms. Inexperienced
countries that previously were overmatched in negotiations or felt it necessary to offer particularly company-friendly terms to attract investors might have
later developed a robust mining sector and now are
seen as a desirable investment destination. Or a new
government comes into power and initiates a review
of agreements negotiated by the prior regime. This
was the case in Guinea in 2010 when the new president Alpha Conde immediately began an examination
of deals of deceased former ruler Lansana Conte. 322
Additionally, the terms of most agreements were made
when there was still significant uncertainty about the
geology, duration, economics, political stability and
other factors that could affect the commercial viability
of the project.323 While an agreement should ensure
security of tenure, it should not preclude the ability to
make necessary corrections.324
Companies often push for the inclusion of stability
provisions in contracts, frequently the protections are
asymmetrical, specifically allowing companies to take
advantage of changes to the legal or regulatory regime
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that benefit them.325 Even with that, companies regularly ask governments to renegotiate terms. In fact,
one international lawyer related that a high-ranking
executive at his client, a major multinational mining
company, told him that the company knows that these
contracts will be renegotiated over time. From its perspective, the key issue is establishing clear triggers and
processes for renegotiation so that it is not a surprise
when it does happen. 326 The company would much
rather build in an orderly safety valve than pretend
the contract is set in stone.327 This idea is conceptually similar to the concept of periodic review, whether
predicated on a time interval or specific triggers, discussed earlier, which suggests this company’s perspective might be an outlier.
Additionally, companies can take steps to avoid
renegotiations by negotiating balanced agreements.
A mining project is a long and collaborative process,
and prioritizing short-term wins at the negotiating
table over building on a strong working relationship
lays the groundwork for future situations where the
government has no choice but to force renegotiation
or cancellation.328 One international advisor observed
however that some companies have the cynical view
that it is better to negotiate imbalanced agreements
with the expectation of later renegotiation because it
will allow the company to appease the government by
making concessions, but will generally still not fully
correct the initial imbalance.
Generally agreements can be renegotiated or cancelled
if the original negotiation involved fraud or corruption. Last year, the Guinean government cancelled the
deeply controversial Simandou iron ore mine operated
by BSG Resources, alleging that the company gained
the concession through corruption.329 Section 157 of
the country’s (then) Mining Code allowed for a mining
title to be revoked if a company violates the prohibition on bribery.
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But renegotiation is as much a political issue as a legal
one, and if after a few years, the perception is that
the country got “a raw deal,” the government might
demand to renegotiate.330 The government will review
the legality of the contract and confirm whether it is
bound by its terms. Was it just signed by the minister?
Did he have the proper authority? Was it in conflict
with the laws? If it was, was it enacted by parliament
to give it force of law? If not, perhaps the government
can claim it is invalid. A four-year review of more than
60 contracts by the DRC government resulted in the
renegotiation of two-thirds and the cancellation of the
rest.331
Usually, the company wants to maintain its operations and working relationship with the government.
It also might be concerned about the many ways the
government could legally impair its operations (slow
the issuance of necessary permits, etc.), so it might be
amenable to sitting down and discussing an alteration
of terms. The company might be particularly willing to
talk if it is aware it had negotiated too good a deal for
itself.332 Nevertheless, for a government, the decision to
cancel or force the renegotiation of a natural resources
agreement can be a risky tactic that could have significant ramifications including financial penalties and
damage to the country’s reputation with investors.
The corruption that caused the Guinean government
to revoke BSG Resource’s mining title could only have
happened because the Conte government previously
revoked the licenses from Rio Tinto on claims that the
company was not developing the site fast enough. This
appeared to be a pretext so the rights could be sold to
BSG Resources on very attractive terms for the company
and with no upfront payments to the government. That
ultimately prompted the bribery investigation when the
new government came to power as well as a tangle of
lawsuits between the companies and little to show for it
all in terms of development of the iron ore deposit.333

and included in mining agreements, particularly when a
company is concerned about the competence and independence of the judicial system of its state-partner.334
Unlike litigation, arbitration tends to be a closed proceeding and the parties and the arbitrators have much
more discretion in how it will be conducted. 335 Arbitration provisions in agreements establish the law that
will govern the dispute and the method of resolution.
Often the agreements leave the other terms vague
which can cause further complications in the midst of
a dispute. The agreement usually designates one of the
established sets of procedural rules to govern the arbitration, which include the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC). It will also designate the “seat” of the arbitration,
which determines what set of laws will supplement
any gaps in the arbitral rules.336
The result is that arbitration can be extremely expensive and time consuming.337 It can also be highly problematic, particularly for governments. The penalties
awarded can also be quite high and the grounds for
appeal narrow. Large penalties against governments as
a result of confidential procedures have been criticized
for being in conflict with principles of good governance, transparency and accountability.338 Countries
that negotiated regulatory terms into agreements can
also find themselves in situations where areas are subject to arbitration that shouldn’t be, like environmental law.339 Some experts have also expressed concern
about the potential chilling effect that can result from
threats of arbitration; countries lacking the finances or
capacity, afraid of potential arbitration choosing not to
enact or improve regulations that would improve the
environment or public welfare. 340 The number of cases
related to natural resources brought under arbitration
334

Disputes that cannot be settled amicably can also be
submitted to arbitration. Most agreements include
clauses providing for international arbitration. It is
commonly used in international commercial disputes
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by foreign companies against countries has increased
significantly in recent years further exacerbating the
concern.341
In addition, companies have the added protection
of investment treaties – where the host country has
concluded one with the home country of the company
– and can separately (or in addition) sue the government in an investment arbitration. Investment treaties
are agreements between states that establish terms,
conditions and protections for private investment by
companies of one state in the other state. 342

THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL
A SSISTANCE
It is clear many governments – especially in developing countries – face significant challenges in negotiations including asymmetrical information, inferior
resources, and inexperience with the complexities
of many resource contracts.343 For that reason, many
countries will bring in external advisors, experts, and
negotiators.344 That assistance is not limited to legal
help. Expertise is often needed in geology, estimating
mineral potential, mineral economics, mining operation and management, and developing financial models. Even an experienced mining negotiator will not
have all the necessary knowledge, so it is not unusual
to have a number of advisors contributing to different
specific areas of the negotiation. But these are highly
technical and increasingly expensive skill sets and the
government has to decide which help to bring in and
how to do that.
The study found there is no one way external advisors
are brought into the process. They can be brought
in on the basis of personal relationships with the
government or because they were recommended by
other governments. Sometimes help can be brought
in by donor institutions. Pro bono legal assistance
might be available for developing countries from
organizations like the International Senior Lawyers

Project. Frequently regional development banks, legal
support funds or international financial institutions
will provide governments with financial support for
advisors.345 However, the fact that the government did
not choose that expert can cause a disconnect between
government and expert, potentially leading to the
government doubting the expert’s loyalty and ignoring the expert’s advice.346 Sometimes the company
will hire experts to assist the government because the
government’s lack of understanding or its unrealistic
expectations are hampering negotiations. This route
can put the advisor at risk of being perceived by the
government as an agent of the mining company. 347
The government’s concerns regarding experts hired
by the company or other third parties are not unreasonable. Conflicts of interest in this area are an oft
overlooked but frequent occurrence, and unscrupulous
advisors have caused harm to countries.348 Corporate
law firms, concerned about alienating better paying
potential corporate clients, can censor themselves or
assign inexperienced associates.349 As discussed in the
context of external pressures, international institutions have their own agendas which may not always be
aligned with those of the government and yet can filter
through their selection of experts and advisors. 350 Referring advisors with undisclosed interests is a subtle
but effective way to influence an agreement. 351
Ulterior motives are not the only potential issue with
donor assistance. According to several international
advisors, donor-provided expertise is often not the best
available. Donors are inexperienced in evaluating and
hiring the appropriate experts and matching expertise
to right project. They do not pay rates competitive for
top of the line legal assistance and fail to appreciate
that resource extraction is a business which requires
that type of management.352 The opportunity costs
required to find contracting opportunities or prepare
bid tenders can shrink the pool of available talent. 353
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Many donors are non-profits and so have to take the
help they are offered. But a U.S. securities lawyer doing
some pro bono work advising the government will not
match up well with a company lawyer who has made a
career of this work.354 More than one expert described
seeing agreements drafted by such external advisors full of holes big enough “you could drive a truck
through it.”355
In addition to providing sub-optimal assistance, donor
institutions can provide too much assistance related to
mining law, contracts and capacity building. International aid organizations do not necessarily coordinate
well and many are focused on spending their yearly budget, which can result in a government being
overwhelmed by advisors with conflicting mandates,
overlapping expertise, and different opinions. So many
experts, missions and consultations make it even
harder for advisors to develop relationships with the
recipient government. Of course, the government lacks
the capacity to manage all this advice, but since it is
not the one paying, it does not turn it down. Afghanistan is a prime example of this problem. 356
For these reasons, a developing government might
be better advised to retain its own external advisors.
There are some donor institutions, like the African
Legal Support Facility, that supply loans or grants to
facilitate developing governments in hiring external
advisors, but this would otherwise require a government to be willing to make the financial commitment necessary to secure the best possible expert
assistance.357 This is something that many developing
governments seem reluctant to do until an issue reaches international arbitration, when it may be too late.
Greater investment in assistance during the negotiation process could prevent the larger expenditures (and
higher risk of a binding, unfavorable outcome) when a
poor deal results in arbitration.358
Another argument for a developing government taking
ownership of its expert assistance is the value of cultivating long-term relationships with its advisors. Every
country deals with its natural resources in different

ways that reflect its values and experience.359 Some
emphasize the rights of landowners to the minerals on
their property; others maintain that minerals belong
to the country as a whole. External advisors will need
to be educated on legal, economic and political circumstances, and perspectives in the country that will
influence the negotiations, as well as the government’s
often conflicting priorities and objectives.360 This is
quite difficult when international advisors are so often
not retained throughout the entire process.361 The government further benefits from an existing relationship
between the advisor and the rest of the negotiating
team. There can be distrust in new relationships. The
loyalty of the advisor to government has to be demonstrated. The cultural disconnect must be overcome.
These are not issues in countries where there is past
working experience.362 In one instance in Sierra Leone,
the World Bank awarded a contract for four mining
concession negotiations which gave the advisor time to
establish a working relationship with the government
there and which reportedly worked very well. 363 Unfortunately, political instability and the usual turnover of
government officials can mean that frequently within
a few years of one project the advisor’s connection
is severed, or new donors are unfamiliar with who
worked on past projects and so the previous advisor is
not invited back.364 Those interviewed suggested that
“governments tend to have very short memories.”365
However once external advisors are brought in and
present, the question becomes, what is the role they
should play in the negotiation process? Some advisors
describe their role as simply that, to advise. 366 The
government has the prerogative to disagree. 367 In fact,
advisors should demure if the government wants them
to tell it what to do. The government is the entity that
needs to have ownership of the negotiation process.368
Those interviewed who supported this position expressed concern that an international advisor active
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at the negotiating table can lessen the government’s
buy-in into the resulting agreement and allow it to
later blame foreign advisors for its terms. 369 In this
conception, best practice for the advisor is to develop a core of government officials and lawyers who
understand the contract and what its impacts will be
and assist them as they gain experience.370 The advisor will do most of his or her work during negotiation
preparations helping build consensus from the disparate views of the representatives from all the relevant
government ministries/agencies. This approach has the
benefit of building internal consensus which makes
the resulting agreement more stable. 371 This could also
include the government team drafting the agreement
(with the assistance of advisors) so it is clear what they
are agreeing to. 372 For some advisors, this approach
extends to restricting themselves from speaking at the
negotiating table; however, others take the view that if
the team has prepared properly and everyone is on the
same page, then it shouldn’t matter who speaks. 373
Other advisors advocate for a much more active role
at the negotiating table, arguing that if advisors are
empowered to engage with the company, they are in
a position to play a role, if necessary, that the government representatives cannot. As a result of their
outsider status, they have the ability to say things
that government representatives might not want, or
might not be able to say out of fear of damaging their
relationships with the company. The external advisors
can operate as the proverbial “bad cop,” an aggressive
advocate putting forward the government’s positions
and challenging the company’s, while allowing the
government the option of supporting the advisors’
positions or backing down.374
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The laws governing mining and related contracts are
different across the world. They differ in every country. In most countries, natural resources are owned
by the state, but private companies – sometimes in
partnership with state-owned mining companies – do
the actual exploration and extraction of the minerals.
The granting of mineral rights is the point of entry for
companies into a country’s mining sector. A mineral
right gives a company the exclusive ability to undertake mining-related activities within a designated area
and sets out the responsibilities and obligations that
that right entails.
The two primary regimes for granting and administrating mineral rights are contracts and licensing.
Licensing regimes, based on generally applicable laws
and with limited discretionary term-setting are the
typical method for awarding mineral rights in countries with robust legal frameworks and strong government institutions. In countries with young mining sectors, often incomplete or inadequate legal frameworks,
and inexperienced and capacity-limited government
institutions, mineral rights are often granted through
negotiated agreements.
There is a range of different types of resource contracts
depending on the needs of the country, its political and
economic circumstances, its legal regime, and the mining project in question, among others. Joint venture
agreements might be used to facilitate the financing of
an expensive mining project, or to develop economic
linkages and promote technology transfer. Service
agreements might be used because of the importance
of asserting state ownership over its mineral rights.

Relationship Between Contracts and Law
Agreements in a contract-based regime are the primary
texts, establishing the terms of and governing mining
projects. In licensing regimes, negotiated agreements
can supplement or supplant existing laws. They are often used when countries are beginning to develop their
mineral sectors and existing laws are inadequate. Negotiated agreements are also sometimes seen when countries – even those with well-developed legal regimes –
need greater flexibility for special mining projects, such
as extremely large or remote projects.375

Agreements supplementing the law generally contain
substantial detail on the provisions being supplemented, while otherwise referring to existing law. Provisions dependent on factors specific to the project are
the ones most often supplemented and can include
those related to infrastructure or local communities.376
Agreements supplanting the law do not. Those interviewed suggest that fiscal terms are the ones most
often supplanted.377

Contract Issues
While all these types of agreements, detailing the
terms and conditions for managing a specific project,
can compensate for the shortcomings of the existing
legal structures, they frequently fail to achieve optimal
results for the country. The very benefits that make
negotiated agreements so common for the mining
sectors of developing countries can be the source of the
problems that frequently result.
One of the biggest criticisms of negotiating agreements
is that it gives significant discretion to a small number of people, often with little to no oversight, public
consultation, or transparency. Given the financial
potential and economic value of mining agreements,
discretion without proper accountability can create
serious risks of corruption. Unlike legislation that is
public and allows for political accountability, many
negotiations are confidential and often the resulting
contracts are kept confidential as well. This can extend
so far that in some cases, other government ministries
tasked with obligations resulting from the agreement
were still not informed of its terms. 378
Some studies suggest it is possible that negotiated
agreements might also undermine the long-term
growth and stability of a country’s legal framework. 379
Negotiated agreements can depart from or even
supplant the law. Regulatory terms that should not be
open for negotiation may be included in the contract,
which can result in the transfer of the government’s
administrative and regulatory responsibilities to the
company. In countries where weak institutions have
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already created a public lack of confidence in the government, this can create a significant political risk.

The Negotiation Process
The process of negotiating a mineral agreement can
create additional issues for developing countries.
Inexperience and a desperate need for investment and
development put governments in very poor bargaining positions. Asymmetrical information and a poor
understanding of the complexities of the agreement
undermine negotiations. Weak central government
and public institutions hamper government coordination and management. Capacity restraints and the high
cost of enforcement hinder effective oversight

company and local communities. The individuals and
institutions responsible for implementing agreements
can often be different than those who negotiated the
agreements, and in some cases due to poor government coordination or a failure to include relevant
institutions in the negotiations, they can be unaware
of its terms and obligations. The difficulty of these
implementation, monitoring and enforcement responsibilities for inexperienced and capacity-restricted
government institutions can be greatly exacerbated in
contract regimes where they have to administer the
varying terms, standards and definitions of individually negotiated agreements.381

External Assistance
A common problem that contributes to the issues that
governments face in negotiations is capacity and experience. The officials tasked with negotiating a mineral
agreement are often inexperienced and lack the basic
understanding needed for all aspects of the process.
Due to financial constraints, political instability, or
trust issues between the government and its advisors,
government negotiating teams can also experience
significant personnel turnover. It is difficult for a
government to advocate effectively for its interests in a
negotiation when facing such challenges.
Another concern in the negotiation process is external
influences. Far from taking place in a vacuum, due
to the enormous financial, economic, and political
implications at stake, the negotiating team is often
operating under intense pressure from a variety of
stakeholders. While in some cases this influence can
be necessary and useful for the process, it can also
paralyze decision-making and create opportunities for
corruption and political interference.

Implementation
A successful agreement can depend as much on proper
implementation as it does on proper drafting. 380 Yet a
government often faces even more daunting technical and capacity challenges in implementation than
in negotiation. It must oversee the obligations and
commitments of the agreement, conduct audits and
inspections, coordinate between relevant government ministries and communicate regularly with the

Many countries will bring in external advisors, experts, and negotiators to assist with the resource, experience, and information asymmetry issues they face. 382
For inexperienced governments negotiating complex
and far reaching mining agreements against companies with extensive expertise in these areas, the need
for this external support is often undeniable. Yet in interviews for this report, a reoccurring complaint from
many external experts who assist governments in such
negotiations was the lack of coordination between
donors in providing this support. Issues of conflicting
advice, duplication of efforts, and undermined efforts
to build relationships were all raised. Governments and
donor institutions tend to focus most of their attention on the actual contract negotiation process while
devoting insufficient effort and resources on both government preparations for negotiations and monitoring
and implementation of the agreements once they are
signed.
Too many different aid agencies or institutions are
providing the same assistance and services. One expert
complained that an institution like the World Bank
could conduct training for government officials in a
country on mining contract negotiation and then a
few months later, an international NGO would conduct
their own training on contract negotiation. Not only
can this be an issue of resources spent on redundant
support, it can often result in governments receiving conflicting advice. Different donors and different
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experts provide different guidance. Their best practices and approach to the issues might conflict. While
multiple perspectives are often beneficial, for governments with little experience in properly evaluating
conflicting guidance to determine their own best
practice, they can in some cases add to the capacity
issues.383 There can be a freezing effect from too much
assistance.
Lack of coordination between donors can also hinder
relationship building between governments and expert
advisors. To maximize the benefits of expert assistance to governments during contract negotiations,
the external advisors need to be well informed on the
nuances of the country’s legal, economic, and political
situations, and there must be mutual trust between
the advisor and the government’s negotiating team.
Having existing relationships can expedite the development of that understanding and trust. However,
external advisors say donor institutions often initiate
the advisors’ work providing assistance to developing
governments. Due to poor communication, donor
organizations hiring experts to assist a government
are usually unaware of which experts were involved in
past projects in that country. This adds to the existing
challenges external advisors encounter in trying to
build long-standing relationships with governments.

Global Trends
The continued development of legal frameworks and
government institutions in developing countries coupled with the issues entailed by negotiating and implementing contracts has led to a global trend towards
fewer discretionary mechanisms for granting mineral
rights. This is reflected in the licensing practices of
developed countries in the study, such as Australia,
Brazil, Canada and Chile which have a long history of
mineral development and leave only narrowly circumscribed areas open to negotiation.
Increasingly, developing countries – still the primary
users of contract regimes – have begun reviews of the
legal frameworks governing their mineral sectors. The
results of these reform efforts are almost universally
systems with less discretion.

Recently, Guinea amended its Mining Code to make it
generally applicable to all agreements, to restrict the
government’s ability to negotiate tax provisions and
limit agreements to supplementing not supplanting
the Code.384 A new minerals law was also enacted in
Afghanistan in August 2014 to improve the governance
of the mining sector and ensure that any mining contracts entered into must comply with the laws of the
land.385 Liberia is considering a licensing system over
its current contract regime.386
Other countries have adopted model mining agreements and are using them as the basis for their negotiations. Model agreements are similar in concept to
form contracts. Most of the document is established
and non-negotiable; however, it includes certain well
defined areas that are negotiable. These areas can also
frequently only be negotiated within a pre-established
range. Governments are finding that they strengthen their bargaining position and reduce the capacity
challenges they face with more experienced companies
if the topics available for negotiation are terms like the
royalty rate, not how royalties are calculated. In this
study alone, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mongolia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone have all either developed or are
considering developing model mining agreements.
In fact, the only study countries not fitting this trend
are those that are very new to large-scale international
mining (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Ecuador), a country
that lacks even a distinct mining law (Azerbaijan),
and the Philippines, which is the outlier to this global
trend.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are the result of the
comparative analysis of 30 contracts from 13 countries, a review of the legal frameworks of 18 countries,
and interviews with 37 external experts, government
officials, company representatives, and CSOs. They are
intended to provide some initial guidance and help fo-
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cus further discussion on the best potential approaches
for German development cooperation in supporting
developing countries in granting and administering
their mineral rights.

For foreign support providers, the development of
a model mining agreement has the added benefit of
being a large-impact project of finite duration with a
clear deliverable.

Recommendation: Support the development of
strong legal frameworks for mining and supporting
model mining agreements as an interim measure

Recommendation: Support the negotiation of ancillary agreements, including those that govern the
development of infrastructure for a mining project,
the local content plans and community development
agreements

Countries are increasingly dealing with the issues of
discretion, corruption, and government capacity by
limiting the scope of what is negotiable through robust
legal frameworks and a license-based system of granting mineral rights. If done properly, this can facilitate
a country’s sustainable development while keeping it
attractive to foreign investment. Strong mining laws
and a license-based system can strengthen a government’s bargaining position, decrease the information
asymmetries, alleviate government capacity issues, and
decrease the risks, impacts or perception of corruption
or outside interference. It reduces transaction costs by
decreasing the amount of time negotiations require. 387
To achieve such successes, there is both the need and
the opportunity to provide governments with support
for drafting, enacting, and implementing the legislation and regulations needed for a strict license regime.
While not a replacement for a strong legal framework,
model mining agreements can give countries a method for continuing development of its mining sector
during the often lengthy transition to a licensing
regime. Model mining agreements are an increasingly
popular mechanism, but the countries most in need
of model agreements are often the exact ones lacking
the expertise necessary to develop them. There is the
opportunity in those countries to support the development of strong model agreements and to support their
enactment into law as an interim measure, to provide
the opportunity for parliamentary review, public
discussion and transparency. In countries in the longterm process of developing its legal framework, model
agreements – even those not enacted into law – can
provide a viable mechanism for meeting the country’s
short-term needs.
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Certain aspects of mining projects, such as those related to local content requirements, infrastructure, or the
benefits to be conferred on affected communities, are
more specifically addressed in ancillary agreements.
This is because such issues tend to be more project-specific than other mining provisions governing the rights
and obligations of the parties – whether it be in a
mining contract, or in law where a project is governed
by a licensing regime.
While the principle government local content obligations can be addressed in generic laws, and some
project-specific principles can be addressed in contracts, the details of the implementation plan of the
local content provisions are typically found in a local
content plan that must be approved by a government
representative or committee. It usually requires an
assessment of the present and future skills available in
the country as compared with the evolving demands
of the company. It should propose sliding scale targets to be reached over time, enabling means such as
training programs, review periods and enforcement
mechanisms. While it is often seen as a company’s
exercise, it should in fact proceed from a public-private
partnership around the issue, stating the obligations
of the government as well. Therefore, we consider this
local content plan as being an agreement between the
parties as well. Given its impact on the realization of
local content, assistance for managing the local content process is also needed.
In turn, while some basic infrastructure requirements
– such as the need for transport or power infrastructure, or the right to use water from a particular source,
may be included in a mining contract or license,
detailed requirements for the construction, financing,
operation, and maintenance of key infrastructure is
likely to require additional agreements. Special care in
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negotiating such agreements will be required where
the government wishes to promote open access of the
mining–related infrastructure and when the infrastructure serving the mine is operated by a third party.
Finally, in respect of affected communities, separate
community development agreements are increasingly
common to set out particular company obligations.
The requirement to consult with affected community
representatives may be set out in the mining contract
itself, but the details of when, how, and with which
community representatives to do so is more likely to
be found in a CDA.
Such mining-related agreements should of course
present no contradiction with the mining agreement,
which could expressly require such agreements to be
entered into and may even set out the principles that
should govern those agreements.
While most of the emphasis on contract negotiations is
placed on the mining contract itself, the specific nature
of each of these types of agreements requires specialized expertise that may be lacking in a government
negotiating team. External assistance with the preparation for, and negotiation and implementation of such
agreements could go a long way towards promoting
the sustainability of mining projects.

beneficial to all stakeholders.388 While less optimal,
support should also be given to efforts requiring the
ratification of mining agreements which will improve
oversight and allow for public accountability earlier in
the contract process.

Recommendation: Better coordinate donor
assistance.
Improved coordination among multilateral aid organizations, donor governments, and the pool of experts
and advisors working in this space would make negotiation assistance more efficient and effective. Establishment of a donor coordination framework specific to
supporting the mineral sector in developing countries
or another mechanism for increased communication
between donor governments, multilateral institutions
and international experts could address such issues.
It would increase information sharing on past and
future projects and facilitate complementary projects
by donor institutions instead of conflicting ones.
Improved coordination would make it easier to develop multi-project or multi-negotiation relationships
between developing governments and advisors. One
advisor interviewed noted that a coordination framework could also encourage the involvement of more
advisors and experts by lowering the opportunity costs
of finding consultancies and project opportunities.

Recommendation: Promote contract transparency
Open and transparent contracts are critical to good
governance and the publicly accountable management of natural resources in contract-based regimes.
Transparency can mitigate the issues of discretion in
contract negotiation and facilitate effective management. An increasing number of countries now publish
their mining agreements and contract transparency
initiatives are seeing growing traction globally. To
further this progress, support is needed for the development and passage of laws on contract transparency
in developing countries, as well for accompanying the
process of disclosure of contracts in a way that is most

Recommendation: Provide support both before and
after a contract negotiation.
Granting a mineral right may take months or even
years, but the terms of the right may have repercussions for governments for decades. Yet too often, there
is the perception on the part of donor institutions
and developing governments that the granting of a
mineral right is the final endpoint. Donor support in
advance of a mineral right might include geological
mapping, financial modeling, and business strategy

388
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In Guinea, CCSI and NRGI supported by the World Bank partnered with the government’s mining contract review committee
to produce www.contratsminiersguinee.org, which has significantly increased the transparency of the Guinean mining sector
and the knowledge of Guinea’s government officials, citizens,
and investors.

and negotiation support.389 After the right is granted,
while there may be donor agencies that provide some
level of implementation support – OECD for example is
developing Tax Inspectors Without Borders – very little support is given to building integrated government
oversight over the project. From a government perspective, mining projects involve coordinating a number of government ministries and agencies, addressing
administrative and technical issues, and making complex, sector-specific decisions.390 Such capacity building
and support efforts can be especially useful in contract
regimes where the implementing institutions are faced
with terms, standards and definitions that vary due to
individually negotiated agreements. 391
Support is needed for a government implementation
committee that would monitor the ongoing obligations
set out in the right, resolve technical issues, and make
those complex, sector-specific decisions. Provisions
for such a committee should be included in licenses
and mining agreements, including funding provisions
for any external advisor the government may wish to
retain. Support efforts should begin by advocating for
the inclusion of implementation committee provisions
and provisions for its financing in the rights granting
process. Support after the right was granted should
focus on developing compliance manuals detailing all
of the government’s obligations under the agreement,
and on a continued engagement to identify the government’s technical assistance needs as they develop,
for which assistance will be directed through the implementation committee. Support could also be given
for embedding advisors in relevant ministries such as
mining or finance for extended periods to assist during
the early stages of implementation, or hiring domestic
professionals to staff the institutions even if it requires
paying higher rates than other civil service positions.392

Recommendation: Provide nonlegal support to the
negotiation and implementation process.
In addition to expanding support to the entirety of
the negotiation and implementation process, support
needs to be expanded beyond just legal and negotiation
389

390
391
392
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assistance. Governments are often in even greater need
of support with mineral economics, mining operation and management, which can be entirely new to
them. One particular need is assistance in building and
evaluating financial models, a critical area where governments often operate at a significant informational
disadvantage. Governments also are frequently in need
of access to greater geological information, such as
their own geological surveys.
The institutions implementing the agreements need
support and training as well. Capacity building is
needed for the inspectorate responsible for enforcing
mining, safety and environmental regulations. Government auditors as well as economic and ore geologists monitoring revenue and production levels could
benefit from training and assistance.

Recommendation: Support regional legal
harmonization efforts.
The African Mining Vision adopted by the African Union in 2009 put forth a holistic framework for mining
in Africa that included the need to build and integrate
mining networks regionally. African countries have
responded, and there have been legal harmonization efforts around mining at the sub-regional level.
The Economic Community of West African States is
attempting to establish a common code of conduct for
mining in its draft Directive on the Harmonization of
Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector. 393
Such endeavors at regional coordination and eventually regional integration in mining are in the early
stages. These efforts should be supported in developing countries worldwide. Regional cooperation could
potentially accelerate the optimization of mineral resources and expand the scope of economic linkages.394
For countries competing with each other for foreign
investment, regional legal harmonization would reduce
the pressure to engage in a war of incentives. It would
make it easier to develop cross-border mineral deposits
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and increase markets for minerals.395 Regional harmonization of mining-related law would also increase
stability of and trust in the law while strengthening
the position of those countries’ negotiators.

Recommendation: Build government capacity and
understanding of commodity markets.
According to many of those interviewed, despite the
economic scale of mining, most countries do not understand the mining industry or commodities markets.
One corporate representative expressed the belief that
a lack of understanding of the volatile nature of mining’s “boom and bust” cycle contributed to the political
downfall of the prime minister of Australia in 2013. 396
Given the impact that these commodity cycles can
have on the success or failure of mining projects, more
effort is needed to build government understanding of
these complex markets.
Support needs to be given to training programs on
mining commodities and commodities markets for
government decision-makers in the mining sector and
for those involved in negotiations around mining projects. Additional more substantive support should be
given for the education and training of mineral economists and commodities specialists in government in
developing countries.

395
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AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources
Development, “Minerals and Africa’s Development,” (December
2011).
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Regulatory regime section describes the current state of the countries. The other sections describe the contracts collected for the
study - and their relationship with the Law at the date the contract
was signed.
t1
t2

t3
t4
t5
t6

t7

t8

t9
t10
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Civil law mixed with customary & Islamic law.
Mixed legal system of English common law, French civil law, &
customary law.
Mixed with some customary law.
		
Mixed with customary & Islamic law.
The new Minerals Law is being revised.
Liberia began examining a transition to a licensing regime in
2012 but has an MMDA since 2008.
Still unclear if Mozambique’s new law will prohibit contract
negotiations.
Zambia fully transitioned to a licensing regime in 2008, annulling
all previous mining contracts.
			
Upper Middle Income.
Upper Middle Income.
Lower Middle Income.

Note that this study limited its review to publicly available mining contracts, which are more readily available since 2000 owing
to the recent rise of transparency initiatives in the mining sector.
The higher representation of mining contracts in recent years in
the comparison, however, distorts the finding of a trend towards
licensing regimes rather than negotiated contracts.
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